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MISREPRESENTATION IN NORTH CAROLINA
ROBERT G. BYRD*
In the field of misrepresentation, tort law has evolved from
the simple maxim "let the buyer beware" to a much more com-
prehensive response to representations that are false or mislead-
ing. North Carolina's courts and its legislature have each
contributed to this development, imposing liability for represen-
tations made with knowledge of falsity, those made negligently,
and even those made innocently, but which have a capacity to
deceive.
In this Article Professor Robert Byrd explores the scope of
liability for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and representa-
tions amounting to an unfair or deceptive trade practice. In the
field offraud, Professor Byrd finds that the courts have confused
their analyses by importing language that improperly emphasizes
a recipient's duty to determine the accuracy of the representa-
tion. In addition, Professor Byrd argues that the North Carolina
Supreme Court has held incorrectly that reckless disregard of the
falsity of a representation is insufficient to establish fraud.
In the area of negligent misrepresentation, the most signifi-
cant development has been the supreme court's recent recogni-
tion of the tort and its adoption of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, which allows recovery for economic loss even by a person
not in privity of contract with the party making the representa-
tion. Professor Byrd also examines the statutory protection af-
forded to those who might not be able to rely on the traditional
theories of misrepresentation and concludes that the courts will
continue to construe expansively the unfair or deceptive trade
practices statute.
In North Carolina significant changes in the law of misrepresenta-
tion have occurred over time. Major new theories have been recognized
and less obvious changes have been made in traditional law. These devel-
opments entail both judicial and legislative initiatives and clearly reflect
greater willingness to impose liability for misrepresentation. Liability
has been extended beyond the traditional action for deceit to include neg-
* Burton Craige Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. B.S.
1953, J.D. 1956, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Research for this Article was
supported in part by the Albert Coates Law Center. The author wishes to express his appreci-
ation to Joseph Lingle and Matthew Osborne for their valuable research assistance in the prep-
aration of this Article.
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ligent misrepresentation' and, when it constitutes an unfair or deceptive
trade practice,2 even innocent misrepresentation.3 The cause of action in
negligent misrepresentation opens the door to recovery in situations in
which the absence of either scienter or privity of contract once would
have barred relief. Broad recognition of misrepresentation as an unfair
or deceptive trade practice has lowered requirements and expanded dam-
age recoveries in some misrepresentation cases. Consequently, an unfair
or deceptive trade practice cause of action is likely to be a standard part
of the claim for relief in many misrepresentation cases. These develop-
ments are still underway and the rule structure governing these two new
causes of action has not evolved completely.
Changes in the law of fraud, or intentional misrepresentation, in
North Carolina have been, for the most part, more subtle. The shift here
is more in attitude than in formal rule structure. Caveat emptor, to the
extent it ever was, is no longer a major influence. In fact, close study of
the cases discloses that the caveat emptor philosophy never exerted the
dominant impact lawyers and judges often have attributed to it. Never-
theless, some change has taken place. Today, the thrust of the North
Carolina decisions is that reliance upon a representation of fact seriously
made is justified unless reason to suspect its accuracy exists. Accord-
ingly, a cause of action may lie notwithstanding the traditional applica-
bility of caveat emptor.
Several factors create the potential for substantial confusion in the
area of fraud. Much of the terminology used by the North Carolina
Supreme Court is misleading. Language such as "reasonable reliance,"
4
"duty to investigate,"5 and "duty to read' 6 seems to place major respon-
sibility upon the recipient of a representation to determine its accuracy.
These ideas appear more compatible with caveat emptor than the view
that the recipient may justifiably rely on representations of fact intended
by the maker to be taken seriously. Moreover, if actual reliance upon a
representation of fact intended to be taken seriously is enough, any fur-
l. For a discussion of the cause of action for negligent misrepresentation, see infra notes
232-75 and accompanying text.
2. For a discussion of the cause of action for unfair or deceptive trade practices, see infra
notes 276-352 and accompanying text.
3. The Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes a damage cause of action for innocent
misrepresentation in connection with sale, rental, or exchange transactions. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 552C (1977). North Carolina has not recognized this cause of action
except in the context of the statutory cause of action for unfair or deceptive trade practices.
4. For a discussion of reasonable reliance, see infra notes 47-73 and accompanying text.
5. For a discussion of the duty to investigate, see infra notes 109-33 and accompanying
text.
6. For a discussion of the duty to read, see infra notes 134-64 and accompanying text.
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ther inquiry about the reasonableness of that reliance is simply a redun-
dancy that invites error.
In addition, the importance of the duties to investigate and to read
in fraud claims may be exaggerated unless one reads the cases carefully.
If the fraud claim is unsuccessful and the claimant has no other substan-
tive grounds for recovery, the supreme court, in denying relief, frequently
has emphasized the claimant's duty to investigate or duty to read. The
court apparently uses the duty rationale in these cases to convey its view
that disappointed expectations and unilateral mistake provide no basis
for relief.7 The court's reliance on the duty rationale clearly is unrelated
to the rejection of the fraud claim.
Furthermore, in an unexpected recent development the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court held that reckless disregard of the falsity of a repre-
sentation is insufficient to establish fraud.' This development not only
runs counter to the trend enlarging liability for misrepresentation but
also lacks support in both judicial precedent and sound policy.9
Viewing these changes in the law of misrepresentation separately
fails to reflect their major impact on North Carolina law. A misrepresen-
tation claim no longer can be evaluated solely in terms of fraud. Lawyers
must also take into account an expanding body of law that may enlarge
both the substantive right of recovery and the remedies available for en-
forcement of that right. This Article explores the law of misrepresenta-
tion in North Carolina in light of these developments.
I. THE ELEMENTS OF FRAUD
Actionable fraud consists of (1) a false representation or conceal-
ment of a material fact that (2) is intended to and (3) does in fact (4)
reasonably induce reliance and (5) results in injury or damage.1" Fault or
scienter is also required.11
7. See infra notes 116-19, 140-51 and accompanying text.
8. Myers & Chapman, Inc. v. Thomas G. Evans, Inc., 323 N.C. 559, 568-69, 374 S.E.2d
385, 391-92 (1988).
9. For a discussion of Myers & Chapman, see infra notes 18-38 and accompanying text.
10. Pearce v. American Defender Life Ins. Co., 316 N.C. 461, 468, 343 S.E.2d 174, 178
(1986) (citing Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 286 N.C. 130, 138, 209 S.E.2d 494, 500 (1974)).
11. See Zager v. Setzer, 242 N.C. 493, 495, 88 S.E.2d 94, 95 (1955). Traditionally, North
Carolina courts defined scienter as a state of mind in which one makes a representation with
knowledge that it was false or in reckless disregard of its falsity. Id.; Calloway v. Wyatt, 246
N.C. 129, 133, 97 S.E.2d 881, 884 (1957). Recently, the North Carolina Supreme Court rede-
fined scienter, predicating it exclusively on proof of knowing falsity. See Myers & Chapman,
323 N.C. at 568-69, 374 S.E.2d at 391-92 (1988). For a discussion of North Carolina's scien-
ter requirement, see infra notes 18-38.
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A. Materiality
To sustain a fraud action, a misrepresentation must relate to a mate-
rial fact. 12 The Restatement (Second) of Torts adopts an objective stan-
dard to determine materiality."3 Under this standard a matter is material
if a reasonable person making a decision about the transaction would
attach importance to it. 4 A fact is also material when the person repre-
senting it knows that the recipient, because of her ignorance or gullibil-
ity, or for other reasons, will attach importance to it even though a
reasonable person would not.15 In contrast with the Restatement, the
North Carolina Supreme Court apparently has adopted a subjective stan-
dard to determine the materiality of a misrepresentation: 6 "A false rep-
resentation is material when it deceives a person and induces him to
act."" 7 The court, however, has never examined the issue in depth.
B. Scienter
Myers & Chapman, Inc. v. Thomas G. Evans, Inc.,18 a case decided
-in 1988, drastically changed the law of fraud. Before Myers & Chapman,
plaintiffs could show the required element of sufficient awareness of the
falsity of a representation-scienter-by proof that the defendant made
the representation with knowledge of or in reckless disregard of its fal-
sity. 19 Myers & Chapman held that a representation made with reckless
disregard for its falsity is insufficient to establish fraud.2" The court
reasoned:
While the concept of a statement "made with reckless indiffer-
ence as to its truth," or one "recklessly made without knowl-
edge as a positive assertion" . . . have been held to satisfy the
element of "false representation," those concepts do not satisfy
12. White Sewing Mach. Co. v. Bullock, 161 N.C. 1, 6-7, 76 S.E. 634, 636-37 (1912).
13. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 (1977).
14. Id. § 538(2)(a).
15. Id. § 538(2)(b).
16. Keith v. Wilder, 241 N.C. 672, 675, 86 S.E.2d 444, 446 (1955); Cofield v. Griffin, 238
N.C. 377, 379, 78 S.E.2d 131, 133 (1953); White Sewing, 161 N.C. at 7, 76 S.E. at 637. Federal
courts have interpreted the North Carolina cases to apply a subjective standard. See, e.g.,
Homelite v. Trywilk Realty Co., 272 F.2d 688, 691 (4th Cir. 1959).
17. Cofield, 238 N.C. at 379, 78 S.E.2d at 133. In White Sewing the court stated: "The
false representation is material ... if the fact untruly asserted or wrongfully suppressed, if it
had been known to the party, would have influenced his judgment or decision in making the
contract at all." White Sewing, 161 N.C. at 6, 76 S.E.2d at 636 (citation omitted).
18. 323 N.C. 559, 374 S.E.2d 385 (1988).
19. Zager v. Setzer, 242 N.C. 493, 495, 88 S.E.2d 94, 95 (1955); Atkinson v. Charlotte
Builders, Inc., 232 N.C. 67, 68, 59 S.E.2d 1, 1-2 (1950); Palomino Mills, Inc. v. Davidson Mills
Corp., 230 N.C. 286, 293, 52 S.E.2d 915, 920 (1949).
20. Myers & Chapman, 323 N.C. at 568-69, 374 S.E.2d at 391-92.
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the element of a statement "made with intent to deceive."
Without the element of intent to deceive, the required scienter
for fraud is not present. The term "scienter" embraces both
knowledge and an intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud.2'
This case is remarkable for several reasons. First, it makes little
sense to say that reckless disregard of falsity is sufficient to establish the
maker's knowledge of the falsity of the representation but is insufficient
to establish the maker's intent to deceive the recipient. Proof of knowing
falsity, which Myers & Chapman required to show an intent to deceive,
will always establish a "false representation" as well.2" Under these cir-
cumstances, it is of no practical significance that one can also show "false
representation" by reckless disregard. Second, the court's suggestion
that cases holding reckless disregard of falsity sufficient to establish sci-
enter are of recent origin23 ignores the court's own early and frequent
reliance on this principle.2 4 Third, the court surprisingly ignored the fact
that an overwhelming majority of jurisdictions hold knowing or reckless
falsity sufficient to show scienter.2 5 Finally, for authority the court relied
upon dicta in earlier cases that, when examined in their full context, seem
to provide little support for the court's holding.26 In light of these cir-
21. Id. at 568, 374 S.E.2d at 391.
22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526(a) cmt. on cl. (a) (1977). The court
apparently uses "false representation" to refer to the defendant's knowledge; the reckless disre-
gard concept, however, is wholly irrelevant to determining whether the representation was
false.
23. Myers & Chapman, 323 N.C. at 567, 374 S.E.2d at 391.
24. E.g., Odom v. Little Rock & 1-85 Corp., 299 N.C. 86, 91-92, 261 S.E.2d 99, 103
(1980), overruled by Myers & Chapman, 323 N.C. at 569, 374 S.E.2d at 391-92; Zager v.
Setzer, 242 N.C. 493, 495, 88 S.E.2d 94, 95 (1955); Atkinson v. Charlotte Builders, Inc., 232
N.C. 67, 68, 59 S.E.2d 1, 1-2 (1950); Dunbar v. Tobacco Growers' Coop. Ass'n, 190 N.C. 608,
609-10, 130 S.E. 505, 506 (1925); Ferebee v. Gordon, 35 N.C. (13 Ired.) 350, 351-52 (1852).
Additional cases relying on the reckless disregard concept are cited infra notes 27, 35.
25. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 107, at
741-42 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON].
26. Neither "knowing or reckless falsity" nor "intent to deceive" was at issue in any case
on which the Myers & Chapman court relied. The cases the court cited provide nothing more
than a listing of the elements of fraud. Even in this limited context, the cases provide little
support for the court's position. One case lists both "reckless indifference as to... truth" and
"an intent to deceive." Myrtle Apartments, Inc. v. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co., 258 N.C.
49, 52, 127 S.E.2d 759, 761 (1962). Another identifies both "knowledge of [the representa-
tion's] falsity or... culpable ignorance of its truth" and "fraudulent intent." Foster v. Snead,
235 N.C. 338, 340, 69 S.E.2d 604, 606 (1952). The other three cases list "intent to deceive"
but do not include knowing or reckless falsity as an element. Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 286 N.C.
130, 138, 209 S.E.2d 494, 500 (1974); Vail v. Vail, 233 N.C. 109, 113, 63 S.E.2d 202, 205
(1951); Ward v. Heath, 222 N.C. 470, 472, 24 S.E.2d 5, 7 (1943). An examination of the full
opinion in Ward clearly shows that the phrase "intent to deceive," as the court used it, ex-
pressed the idea that the representation had to be made both with knowing or reckless falsity
and for the purpose of inducing reliance by the recipient. Ward, 222 N.C. at 472-73, 24 S.E.2d
1992]
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cumstances, it is surprising that the decision in Myers & Chapman was
by a unanimous court and that the court gave so little attention to the
impact of its decision.
After Myers & Chapman, fraud can be established only by proof of
knowing falsity. Yet, it is difficult to identify any compelling reason for
denying recovery when a false representation is made recklessly for the
purpose of inducing the recipient's reliance. If an intent beyond the in-
tent to induce reliance and action is required and proof of reckless disre-
gard is insufficient to establish it, the result is that only by proof of
knowing falsity can fraud be established. The rule in Myers & Chapman
clearly needs to be reexamined. A better understanding of prior North
Carolina case law may explain why the court reached this unusual deci-
sion but, more importantly, also discloses why the decision is wrong.
At least four versions of the elements of fraud are set out in the
North Carolina cases. Each version requires (1) actual and (2) reason-
able reliance (3) upon a material misrepresentation of fact (4) that results
in harm. One group of cases adds knowing or reckless falsity and an
intent to induce the recipient's reliance.27 A second group includes an
intent to deceive or, in the alternative, knowing or reckless falsity and an
intent to induce the recipient's reliance.2' A third set of cases lists an
intent to deceive, but includes neither knowing or reckless falsity nor an
intent to induce the recipient's reliance.29 Finally, a fourth version incor-
porates knowing or reckless falsity and an intent to deceive, but does not
list an intent to influence the recipient's reliance.30
It is difficult to believe that these different statements of the elements
of fraud have any substantive importance. The court has repeated each
at 8. This usage reconciles for the most part the various lists of the elements of fraud given in
many North Carolina Supreme Court decisions. See infra text accompanying notes 27-34,
27. E.g., Johnson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C. 247, 253, 266 S.E.2d 610, 615
(1980); Odom, 299 N.C. at 91-92, 261 S.E.2d at 103; Lamm v. Crumple, 240 N.C. 35, 44, 81
S.E.2d 138, 145 (1954); Cofield v. Griffin, 238 N.C. 377, 379, 78 S.E.2d 131, 133 (1953); Bell v.
Harrison, 179 N.C. 190, 195-96, 102 S.E. 200, 203 (1920); Robertson v. Halton, 156 N.C. 215,
221, 72 S.E. 316, 318-19 (1911).
28. E.g., Dorsey v. Dorsey, 306 N.C. 545, 548, 293 S.E.2d 777, 779 (1982); Ward, 222
N.C. at 472-73, 24 S.E.2d at 8; Bolich v. Prudential Ins. Co., 206 N.C. 144, 155, 173 S.E. 320,
326 (1934); Pritchard v. Dailey, 168 N.C. 330, 332, 84 S.E. 392, 393 (1915).
29. E.g., Watts v. Cumberland County Hosp. Sys., 317 N.C. 110, 116-17, 343 SE.2d 879,
884 (1986); Pearce v. American Defender Life Ins. Co., 316 N.C. 461, 468, 343 S.E.2d 174,
178 (1986); Terry v. Terry, 302 N.C. 77, 83, 273 S.E.2d 674, 677 (1981); Ragsdale, 286 N.C. at
138-39, 209 S.E.2d at 500; Early v. Eley, 243 N.C. 695, 697-98, 91 S.E.2d 919, 921 (1956);
Hardy v. Southern Loan & Ins. Co., 218 N.C. 129, 134, 10 S.E.2d 599, 601 (1940).
30. E.g., Davis v. Davis, 256 N.C. 468, 471, 124 S.E.2d 130, 133 (1962); New Bern v.
White, 251 N.C. 65, 68, 110 S.E.2d 446, 448 (1959); Leggett Elec. Co. v. Morrison, 194 N.C.
316, 317, 139 S.E. 455, 455 (1927).
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of them many times."1 Nothing suggests that the selection of one over
another was for the purpose of affecting the outcome of a case or in fact
did affect the outcome in any case. Before Myers & Chapman the court
never gave the slightest indication that any conflict existed between these
superficially different statements of the elements of fraud.
These circumstances strongly suggest the difference in the state-
ments is one of language rather than substance. Moreover, a sensible
way to reconcile the statements exists. Under two versions, the first and
second, fraud exists when knowing or reckless falsity and an intent to
induce the recipient's reliance are present. The second version merely
equates "intent to deceive" with these two factors. At a minimum, the
"intent to deceive" language in the third version must be interpreted to
include both knowing or reckless falsity and intent to induce reliance,
because these factors clearly are essential for fraud and are not included
otherwise. In this overall context, it is entirely reasonable under the
fourth version to interpret "intent to deceive" to convey the repre-
senter's purpose to induce the recipient's reliance. Rejecting this sug-
gested reconciliation leaves only the implausible explanation that the
court has, whether purposely or not, maintained parallel and conflicting
lines of authority over most of this century.
The court's own opinions support this interpretation. Ward v.
Heath,2 a case relied on in Myers & Chapman because it listed "intent to
deceive" as an element of fraud, is illustrative. The court in that case
recognized that proof of knowing or reckless falsity and an intent to in-
duce the recipient's action is sufficient to establish fraud. After approv-
ing a textbook statement to this effect,33 the court went on to say:
It is not always necessary in order to establish actionable
fraud that a false representation should be knowingly made. It
is well recognized with us that under certain conditions and
circumstances if a party to a bargain avers the existence of a
material fact recklessly or affirms its existence positively when
he is consciously ignorant whether it be true or false he must be
held responsible for a falsehood. 4
Thus, the Myers & Chapman court's suggestion forty-five years after
Ward that the reckless disregard concept is "based on language in recent
cases" is inconsistent with the facts. Over a long period of time the
court, in setting forth the elements of fraud, has routinely incorporated
31. See supra cases cited notes 27-30.
32. 222 N.C. 470, 24 S.E.2d 5 (1943).
33. Id. at 472-73, 24 S.E.2d at 7-8.
34. Id. at 473, 24 S.E.2d at 8.
1992]
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into its opinions statements endorsing the reckless disregard concept."5
Reckless disregard is clearly the basis for the decisions in a number of
older cases.36 For example, Zager v. Setzer37 stated:
And in this sense the evidence fails to disclose affirmatively that
the plaintiff had knowledge of the alleged falsity of his represen-
tation .... However, the evidence is sufficient to support the
inference that the plaintiff's representation ... was recklessly
made, or positively averred when he was consciously ignorant
whether it was true or false .... The evidence tending to show
this state of mind is an adequate substitute for proof of
scienter.a
8
The supreme court should overrule Myers & Chapman. The deci-
sion is questionable on several grounds. Prior case law, including those
cases the court cited in support of its decision, is inconsistent with the
court's holding that proof of reckless disregard is insufficient to establish
scienter. The court's position that reckless disregard is sufficient to es-
tablish knowing falsity but insufficient to establish scienter introduces a
distinction that has no meaningful application. The decision does not
reflect sound policy. Finally, there is no indication in the Myers & Chap-
man opinion that the court was aware of or considered any of these
matters.
C. Actual Reliance
A fraud cause of action requires that the claimant in fact relies on
the defendant's misrepresentation. 9 When the plaintiff knows the true
facts,"° is aware that the representations are false,41 or would enter into
35. See Haywood v. Morton, 209 N.C. 235, 238, 183 S.E. 280, 281 (1955); Dunbar v.
Tobacco Growers Coop. Ass'n, 190 N.C. 608, 609-10, 130 S.E. 505, 506 (1925); Currie v.
Malloy, 185 N.C. 206, 214, 116 S.E. 564, 568 (1923); Whitehurst v. Life Ins. Co., 149 N.C.
273, 277, 62 S.E. 1067, 1068 (1908); Modlin v. Roanoke R.R. & Navigation Co., 145 N.C. 218,
226, 58 S.E. 1075, 1078 (1907); Ferebee v. Gordon, 35 N.C. (13 Ired.) 350, 351-52 (1852). For
additional cases relying on the reckless disregard concept, see supra note 27.
36. See, eg., Zager v. Setzer, 242 N.C. 493, 495, 88 S.E.2d 94, 95 (1955); Atkinson v.
Charlotte Builders, Inc., 232 N.C. 67, 68, 59 S.E.2d 1, 1-2 (1950); Palomino Mills, Inc. v.
Davidson Mills Corp., 230 N.C. 286, 293, 52 S.E.2d 915, 925 (1949).
37. 242 N.C. 493, 88 S.E.2d 94 (1955).
38. Id. at 495, 88 S.E.2d at 95.
39. Eastern Steel Prods. Corp. v. Chestnutt, 252 N.C. 269, 276, 113 S.E.2d 587, 593
(1960); Simpson v. Tobacco Growers Coop. Ass'n., 190 N.C. 603, 604, 130 S.E. 507, 507
(1925); Von Hagel v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 91 N.C. App. 58, 63, 370 S.E.2d 695, 699
(1988).
40. Fishblate v. Fidelity Co., 140 N.C. 589, 594, 53 S.E. 354, 356 (1906); Conley v. Coffin,
115 N.C. 563, 566, 20 S.E. 207, 208 (1894); Brown v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 90




the transaction regardless of their truth or falsity,42 no actual reliance
exists and a cause of action in fraud cannot be sustained. A claim of
actual reliance obviously must fail when the claimant acts on the basis of
the claimant's own determination of the facts.4" The fact that a claimant
undertook independent inquiry or investigation of the facts is some evi-
dence that the claimant relied upon his own determination rather than
the defendant's representation. Such an inquiry or investigation does
not, however, necessarily preclude reliance upon the representation.
When a claimant enters into a transaction after an investigation in which
he did not or could not discover the true facts, it is likely that the claim-
ant ultimately relied upon the representation. In fact, an investigation
which tends to confirm that the defendant's representations are reliable
logically suggests that actual reliance probably occurred. Although lan-
guage in an occasional case suggests that undertaking such an investiga-
tion precludes a finding of actual reliance,' 4 the North Carolina case law
is generally in accord with these principles.45 In essence, the reliance
must induce the transaction that underlies the claim for relief and a claim
cannot be based upon representations made after the transaction is
completed.46
D. Reasonable Reliance
Actual reliance upon another person's representation is not suffi-
41. Cox v. Johnson, 227 N.C. 69, 70, 40 S.E.2d 418, 418-19 (1946); Follette v. Mutual
Accident Ass'n, 110 N.C. 377, 379, 14 S.E. 923, 924 (1891).
42. Patton v. Champion Fiber Co., 194 N.C. 765, 768, 140 S.E. 734, 736 (1927).
43. Gilmer v. Hanks, 84 N.C. 317, 320 (1881); Daniel Boone Complex, Inc. v. Furst, 57
N.C. App. 282, 286, 291 S.E.2d 296, 299, disc. rev. denied, 306 N.C. 555, 294 S.E.2d 369
(1982).
44. Cash Register Co. v. Townsend, 137 N.C. 652, 657, 50 S.E. 306, 307 (1905); Crowder
v. Langdon, 38 N.C. (3 Ired. Eq.) 476, 484 (1845).
45. See, eg., Pridgen v. Long, 177 N.C. 189, 197, 98 S.E. 451, 454 (1919); Harback v.
Lain & Keonig, Inc., 73 N.C. App. 374, 380-81, 326 S.E.2d 115, 119, dis. rev. denied, 313
N.C. 600, 332 S.E.2d 179 (1985). In State v. Howley, 220 N.C. 113, 16 S.E.2d 705 (1941), a
criminal prosecution for false pretense, the court said:
Moreover, it is well settled in the law pertaining to fraud and deceit that a party is
not entitled to relief on the grounds of false representations where, instead of relying
upon them, he relies on his own knowledge, or resorts to other means of knowledge
.... Yet, it is not always determinable merely from the fact that outside sources are
consulted that there is no reliance on the representations. If under the circumstances
the party be unable to learn the truth from his examination or investigation, or, with-
out fault on his part, does not learn it and in fact relies on the representations, he is
entitled to relief ....
Id. at 119, 16 S.E.2d at 709 (citation omitted).
46. Clark v. East Lake Lumber Co., 158 N.C. 139, 146, 73 S.E. 793, 796 (1912); North-
western Bank v. Rash, 74 N.C. App. 101, 105, 327 S.E72d 302, 305 (1985).
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cient to establish a claim for fraud. In North Carolina, the reliance must
also be reasonable.47 This requirement is one of the most perplexing as-
pects of the fraud cause of action. When one has used a deliberate lie to
injure another and often, as a result, to benefit oneself, the purpose of the
reasonable reliance requirement is not at once obvious. When a transac-
tion rests in fraud, neither contract stability nor the defrauder's expec-
tancy interest merits protection. If these were the only interests involved,
actual reliance, even when the recipient acts imprudently or is easily
taken in, should be sufficient to sustain a claim for fraud.
If the purpose of the reasonable reliance requirement is to weed out
trumped-up claims, its continued use for this purpose is questionable.
The asserted need for an artificial threshold to separate fraudulent claims
from genuine ones has always rested upon untested assumptions about
the number of unwarranted claims and the difficulty of dealing with them
on an individual basis.4" In other areas of the law, rules that once denied
or limited a cause of action because of fear of false claims have been
overturned without untoward consequences.49 If reasonable reliance is
determined under an objective standard that requires the recipient to act
as a prudent person, that standard conflicts with the basic principle that
contributory negligence is not a defense to intentional tort claims.5"
Many authorities now hold that a less exacting standard of care-
justifiable reliance-is sufficient to establish fraud. 1 Under this view, the
recipient of a misrepresentation is justified in believing it to be true unless
its falsity is obvious or unless he knows facts that make reliance unrea-
sonable. 2 Justifiable reliance is not negated because a reasonable person
would have made inquiry or investigation to determine the truth of the
representation. 3 Reliance is justified, however, only when the fact repre-
sented, if true, would be important to a reasonable person's decision to
enter into the transaction.
54
The language in many North Carolina cases seems to place greater
47. Sanders v. Mayo, 186 N.C. 108, 110, 118 S.E. 910, 911 (1923).
48. See Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, 238, 21 A.2d 402, 405 (1941).
49. See id. at 240, 21 A.2d at 405 (permitting recovery for negligent infliction of mental
distress when no contemporaneous physical injury was caused by the negligence).
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 545A (1977).
51. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 25, § 108, at 749-53; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 537.
52. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 25, § 108, at 750; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 541.
53. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 25, § 108, at 752; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 540.




demands upon the recipient before reliance on the truth of a representa-
tion can be found to be reasonable. This impression arises because in
fraud cases the court frequently invokes the concepts of (1) caveat
emptor, (2) the claimant's duty to read any writing she accepts or signs,
and (3) the claimant's duty to investigate the facts represented. In so
doing, the court often characterizes as negligence the recipient's failure
to ascertain the facts important to her decision to enter into the transac-
tion."5 The importance of these ideas in determining the reasonable reli-
ance issue may be exaggerated if one considers only their frequentrepetition in the opinions. Except for the duty-to-read rationale,56 these
ideas usually appear when the facts of the case are otherwise insufficient
to establish fraud or any other substantive basis for relief. For example,
the court has relied on caveat emptor primarily when the fraud claim
failed;57 the court also has declared that the doctrine does not apply
when fraud exists. 8 Some qualification of these statements is necessary
in relation to the duty-to-read cases. Those cases hold reliance unreason-
able as a matter of law when the falsity of the representation appears on
the face of a writing that the recipient fails to read. If the recipient is
prevented from reading the writing by the maker of the representation,
the jury determines whether her reliance is reasonable.5 9
Many decisions strongly support the view that accepting and relying
on a definite and positive representation, without attempting to verify it,
is reasonable unless the recipient has reason to doubt its accuracy.' The
supreme court has set forth the rationale underlying this view in unmis-
takable language. In Walsh v. Hall,61 the court said:
[T]he law does not require a prudent man to deal with everyone
as a rascal and demand covenants to guard against the false-
hood of every representation which may be made as to facts
which constitute material inducements to a contract. There
55. For a full discussion of these cases, see infra text accompanying notes 109-64.
56. For a discussion of the duty-to-read rationale, see infra text accompanying notes 134-
64.
57. See Guy v. First Carolinas Joint Stock Land Bank, 205 N.C. 357, 358, 171 S.E. 341,
342 (1933); Woodridge v. Brown, 149 N.C. 299, 303, 62 S.E. 1076, 1077 (1908); Etheridge v.
Vernoy, 70 N.C. 713, 724 (1874).
58. Hill v. Brower, 76 N.C. 124, 125-26 (1877); Biggs & Co. v. Perkins, 75 N.C. 397, 400
(1876).
59. See infra text accompanying notes 146-64 for a discussion of the cases applying these
principles.
60. See Keith v. Wilder, 241 N.C. 672, 676, 86 S.E.2d 444, 447 (1955); Gray v. Edmonds,
232 N.C. 681, 683, 62 S.E.2d 77, 79 (1950); Currie v. Malloy, 185 N.C. 206, 213, 116 S.E. 564,
567-68 (1923); Bell v. Harrison, 179 N.C. 190, 196-97, 102 S.E 200, 203 (1920); White Sewing
Mach. Co. v. Bullock, 161 N.C. 1, 10-11, 76 S.E. 634, 639 (1912).
61. 66 N.C. 233 (1872).
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must be a reasonable reliance upon the integrity of men or the
transactions of business, trade and commerce could not [pros-
per] ....62
In another case the court addressed the recipient's obligation to in-
vestigate with the same clarity: "'We are not inclined to encourage
falsehood and dishonesty by protecting one who is guilty of such fraud
on the ground that his victim had faith in his word and for that reason
did not pursue inquiries that would have disclosed the falsehood.' ",3
On the other hand, reliance is not reasonable when the falsity of the
representation is either known or patent.64 The recipient cannot close his
eyes to the obvious and later seek damages or rescission for fraud,6" un-
less his failure to observe is caused by trick or artifice of the person mak-
ing the representation."
In holding reliance unreasonable, the supreme court at times has
emphasized that the recipient and maker of the representation had an
equal opportunity to know about the matter represented. 7 In most of
these cases, the fraud claim was unsuccessful for some other reason. In
some of them, the recipient knew that the maker either had no personal
knowledge of the relevant facts6" or relied upon information supplied by
a third party.69 Because of the recipient's knowledge, the court treated
the representation as one of opinion rather than fact. In other cases,
proof of scienter or some other vital element was missing and the task of
the court was essentially to allocate the risk of loss between innocent
parties.7°
Reliance also will not be reasonable if the representation amounts to
62. Id. at 238. This language is often quoted in later cases. See, e.g., Roberson v. Wil-
liams, 240 N.C. 696, 702, 83 S.E.2d 811, 815 (1954); Currie, 185 N.C. at 214, 116 S.E. at 568.
63. White Sewing, 161 N.C. at 9, 76 S.E. at 637 (quoting Hale v. Philbrick, 42 Iowa 81,
83-84 (1875)). Later cases frequently quote this language. See, e.g., Cofield v. Griffin, 238
N.C. 377, 381-82,78 S.E.2d 131, 134(1953); Massey v. Alston, 173 N.C. 215,221, 91 S.E. 964,
967 (1917).
64. Pridgen v. Long, 177 N.C. 189, 197-98, 98 S.E. 451, 454-55 (1919); Lawson v. Baer,
52 N.C. (7 Jones) 461, 462-63 (1860); Simmons v. Horton, 51 N.C. (6 Jones) 278, 280 (1859).
65. Williamson v. Holt, 147 N.C. 515, 520, 61 S.E. 384, 386 (1908).
66. May v. Loomis, 140 N.C. 350, 357, 52 S.E. 728, 730 (1905); Stout v. Harper, 51 N.C.
(6 Jones) 347, 349-50 (1859); Simmons, 51 N.C. (6 Jones) at 280.
67. See McLain v. Shenandoah Life Ins. Co., 224 N.C. 837, 840, 32 S.E.2d 592, 594
(1945); Bennett v. Whippett-Knight Co., 198 N.C. 98, 99, 150 S.E. 676, 676 (1929); Smathers
v. Gilmer, 126 N.C. 757, 759-60, 36 S.E. 153, 154 (1900).
68. See, e.g., Harding v. Southern Loan & Ins. Co., 218 N.C. 129, 135, 10 S.E.2d 599, 602
(1940); Peyton v. Griffin, 195 N.C. 685, 688, 143 S.E. 525, 527 (1928).
69. See, eg., Crowder v. Langdon, 38 N.C. (3 Ired. Eq.) 476, 486 (1845); Spencer v.
McLean, 24 N.C. (2 Ired.) 93, 94 (1841).
70. See, eg., Saunders v. Hatterman, 24 N.C. (2 Ired.) 32, 34 (1841).
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nothing more than an expression of an adversary's opinion, prediction, or
product commendation.7 1 A knowing misrepresentation of the opinion
or intention actually held, however, is a misrepresentation of fact and
may support a recovery in fraud.7 2 Distinguishing fact and opinion in
the law of misrepresentation is more intricate than simply determining
whether the matter represented is on its face one of existing fact.73
Several matters related to reasonable reliance require further consid-
eration. One is opinion. Representations of opinion constitute by far the
most significant group of cases in which relief for fraud is denied on the
ground that claimant's reliance was not reasonable. In addition, the ex-
tent to which a party will be bound by the contents of a writing she signs
or by facts she could have ascertained by reasonable investigation and the
general development of the duty-to-read merit in-depth consideration.
1. Opinion
Generally, to be actionable as fraud a representation must be a state-
ment of fact and must be specific and definite in nature.7 4 The court
rejects the fraud claim when a representation consists only of an expres-
sion of the maker's opinion or judgment,7" a prediction or prophecy
about the future, 6 or a promise of future performance.7 The court has
recognized, however, that the defendant's knowing misrepresentation of
the opinion or intention he actually holds constitutes an actionable mis-
representation of fact.78
A statement in the form of an opinion may imply the existence of
facts and, for this reason, may amount to a fraudulent misrepresentation.
71. Eg., Berwer v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 214 N.C. 554, 557, 200 S.E. 1, 3 (1938).
72. Outcault Advertising Co. v. Fain, 171 N.C. 714, 716, 89 S.E. 35, 36 (1916); White-
hurst v. Life Ins. Co., 149 N.C. 273, 276, 62 S.E. 1067, 1068 (1908); Frey v. Middle Creek
Lumber Co., 144 N.C. 759, 760-61, 57 S.E. 464, 464 (1907).
73. See infra text accompanying notes 88-95.
74. Warfield v. Hicks, 91 N.C. App. 1, 8, 370 S.E.2d 689, 692-93, disc rev. denied, 323
N.C. 629, 374 S.E.2d 602 (1988).
75. See, e.g., Myrtle Apartments, Inc. v. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co., 258 N.C. 49,
52, 127 S.E.2d 759, 761 (1962) (recommendation for installation of new boiler); Massey v.
North Carolina Pub. Serv. Co., 196 N.C. 299, 301, 145 S.E. 561, 562 (1928) (representation of
law); Outcault Advertising, 171 N.C. at 716, 89 S.E. at 36 (cost of advertising).
76. See, e.g., Mills v. Carolina Cemetery Park Corp., 242 N.C. 20, 29-30, 86 S.E.2d 893,
899-900 (1955) (future improvements would be made); Straus Co. v. Economys, 230 N.C. 316,
318, 52 S.E.2d 802, 803 (1949) (time that a truck would arrive); McCormick v. Jackson, 209
N.C. 359, 360, 183 S.E. 369, 370 (1936) (land could be sold for a higher price).
77. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 236 N.C. 208, 211, 72 S.E.2d 414, 415-16 (1952) (support for
life); Clark v. Laurel Park Estates, 196 N.C. 624, 635-36, 146 S.E. 584, 589 (1929) (future
improvements to land).
78. Lee v. Keck, 68 N.C. App. 320, 328, 315 S.E.2d 323, 329, disc rev. denied, 311 N.C.
401, 319 S.E.2d 271 (1984).
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For example, when a seller who knew his horse was diseased represented
that the horse was "a little thin but mending fast," the court held that the
representation implied that the horse was otherwise sound.7 9 In Unitype
Co. v. Ashcraft Bros.,S" the court, in finding the seller's representations
about the performance of a typesetting machine to be actionable, ex-
plained: "Where facts are not equally known by both sides, a statement
of opinion by one who knows the facts best involves very often a state-
ment of a material fact, for he, impliedly, states that he knows facts
which justify his opinion."'"
At the very least, a statement of opinion may imply that the maker
knows of no facts inconsistent with the opinion expressed. On this basis,
the court upheld a cause of action vhen the seller of stock in a corpora-
tion confronting major financial difficulties represented it as a "gold
mine" and a "going concern."82 The court stated: "When [the seller]
undertook to describe the business as a 'gold mine' and a 'going concern'
he incurred a concomitant duty to make a full disclosure of any extenuat-
ing financial circumstances which counteracted his positive assertions
concerning the condition of the corporation." 3
A promise to be performed in the future is characterized as a prom-
issory representation, and a failure to perform the promise alone does not
constitute fraud.8 4 The making of the promise, however, implies an in-
tention to perform and, when none exists, constitutes a misrepresentation
of fact-the promisor's intention or state of mind.85 Obtaining another
person's goods, services, or property by means of a promise to pay or to
render other performance when the promisor intends to do neither is
fraudulent.86 The intention not to perform usually must be shown by
circumstantial evidence. Proof of nonperformance, without more, is in-
sufficient to establish fraudulent intent.8 7
No clear line separates representations of fact and opinion. Neither
79. Whitmire v. Heath, 155 N.C. 304, 306-07, 71 S.E. 313, 314 (1911).
80. 155 N.C. 63, 71 S.E. 61 (1911).
81. Id. at 67, 71 S.E. at 62.
82. Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 286 N.C. 130, 139, 209 S.E.2d 494, 500 (1974).
83. Id. at 139, 209 S.E.2d at 501.
84. Mills v. Carolina Cemetery Park Corp., 242 N.C. 20, 30, 86 S.E.2d 893, 900 (1955);
J.B. Colt & Co. v. Norwood, 202 N.C. 819, 820, 161 S.E. 706, 707 (1932); Elizabeth City Hotel
Corp. v. Overman, 201 N.C. 337, 341, 160 S.E. 289, 291 (1931).
85. Lamm v. Crumpler, 240 N.C. 35, 44, 81 S.E.2d 138, 145 (1954); Roberson v. Swain,
235 N.C. 50, 55, 69 S.E.2d 15, 19 (1952); Littlejohn v. Johnson, 214 N.C. 221, 221, 198 S.E.
639, 639 (1938).
86. Williams v. Hedgepeth, 184 N.C. 114, 116, 113 S.E. 602, 602-03 (1922).
87. See Britt v. Britt, 320 N.C. 573, 580, 359 S.E.2d 467, 471 (1987); Williams v. Wil-
liams, 220 N.C. 806, 810, 18 S.E.2d 364, 366 (1941).
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the form nor the language of the representation necessarily controls its
classification."8  The usual formulation of the rule-that reliance is un-
reasonable if the representation is opinion-is somewhat misleading.
Some cases fall into this pattern. 9 In other cases, however, the court's
classification of a representation as fact or opinion seems to depend on its
determination whether the representation invited reasonable reliance.90
The cases suggest that when the maker offers representations seriously
and in a manner calculated to induce reliance, even though "clothed in
the form of an opinion or estimate,"'" a fraud action can be main-
tained.92 On the other hand, a representation that appears on its face to
be fact may be regarded as opinion when the recipient knows that the
maker has no personal knowledge or is only offering an estimate.93
Moreover, "when there is doubt as to whether [the representations] were
intended and received as mere expressions of opinion or as statements of
fact to be regarded as material, the question must be submitted to the
jury." 94 In such cases, the fact that knowledge of the matters represented
is readily available to the recipient by inquiry or investigation is relevant
to the jury's determination.95
Courts view sales talk, puffing, commendation, and other represen-
tations by which a seller promotes her product as opinions that usually
provide no basis for a fraud action.96 "'One who relies on such affirma-
tions made by a person whose interest might prompt him to invest the
property with exaggerated value does so at his peril, and must take the
88. See Shell v. Roseman, 155 N.C. 90, 94, 71 S.E. 86, 87 (1911); J.I. Case Threshing
Mach. Co. v. Feezor, 152 N.C. 516, 518-20, 67 S.E. 1004, 1006-07 (1910); Williamson v. Holt,
147 N.C. 515, 523-24, 61 S.E. 384, 386-87 (1908).
89. See, e.g., Horton v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 255 N.C. 675, 680, 122 S.E.2d 716, 720
(1961); Pritchard v. Dailey, 168 N.C. 330, 332, 84 S.E. 392, 393 (1915).
90. For example, whether representations about the capacity and performance of machin-
ery constitute fact or opinion may depend on the maker's perception of how the recipient is
likely to receive them. See American Laundry Mach. Co. v. Skinner, 225 N.C. 285, 290, 34
S.E.2d 190, 193 (1945) (opinion); J.B. Colt Co. v. Conner, 194 N.C. 344, 346, 139 S.E. 694,
695 (1927) (opinion); Unitype Co. v. Ashcraft Bros., 155 N.C. 63, 68, 71 S.E. 61, 62-63 (1911)
(fact); JI. Case, 152 N.C. at 519-20, 67 S.E. at 1006-07 (fact).
91. Whitehurst v. Life Ins. Co., 149 N.C. 273, 276, 62 S.E. 1067, 1068 (1908).
92. See Bolich v. Prudential Ins. Co., 206 N.C. 144, 155, 173 S.E. 320, 326 (1934); Pate v.
Blades, 163 N.C. 267, 272, 79 S.E. 608, 610 (1913); Whitehurst, 149 N.C. at 276, 62 S.E. at
1068.
93. See Galloway v. Goolsby, 176 N.C. 635, 638, 97 S.E. 617, 618 (1918); Parker v. Ra-
leigh Say. Bank, 152 N.C. 253, 255, 67 S.E: 492, 493 (1910).
94. Whitehurst, 149 N.C. at 276, 62 S.E. at 1068.
95. See Outcault Advertising Co. v. Fain, 171 N.C. 714, 716, 89 S.E. 35, 36 (1916); Frey
v. Middle Creek Lumber Co., 144 N.C. 759, 760-61, 57 S.E. 464, 464 (1907).
96. See Early v. Eley, 243 N.C. 695, 698, 91 S.E.2d 919, 921 (1956); Oltman v. Williams,
167 N.C. 312, 313, 83 S.E. 348, 349 (1914); National Cash Register Co. v. Townsend Grocery
Store, 137 N.C. 652, 655-57, 50 S.E. 306, 307 (1905).
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consequences of his imprudence.' ,9 General statements about the fu-
ture performance and potential profitability of property or a business fall
into this category.9 8 Similar statements about the'work capacity of ma-
chinery, the quality of its performance, and the efficiency of its operation
also provide no basis for a fraud action.99
The cases frequently declare that promises, predictions, prophecies,
and similar promissory representations that relate to events in the future
are opinions and thus provide no basis for fraud claims."° Promissory
representations, even when tailored for particular occasions, amount to
little more than projections of future success and will be viewed as sales
talk. 01 A fraud claim can arise, however, when the representation con-
sists of a promise to perform in the future and the defendant has no in-
tention to do so.102
By their very nature, some matters such as quality and value are so
much the product of judgment that they clearly represent opinion.
10 3
Quantity, on the other hand, is objectively determinable and usually con-
stitutes fact. 1°4 Although this distinction is important in determining
whether a misrepresentation of fact exists or reliance is justified, other
circumstances surrounding the representation may be more important.
A statement of quantity may represent fact, judgment, or guess. 105 Simi-
larly, surrounding circumstances may show that a representation of
value was intended and received as more than an expression of the
maker's judgment, or was purposely made with the knowledge that it
97. Horton v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 255 N.C. 675, 680, 122 S.E.2d 716, 720 (1961)
(quoting Pritchard v. Dailey, 168 N.C. 330, 332, 84 S.E. 392, 393 (1915)).
98. See id.; Pritchard, 168 N.C. at 332, 84 S.E. at 393.
99. See American Laundry Mach. Co. v. Skinner, 225 N.C. 285, 290, 34 S.E.2d 190, 193
(1945); J.B. Colt Co. v. Conner, 194 N.C. 344, 346, 139 S.E. 694, 695 (1927). Yet such repre-
sentations, when intended and understood as factual, may support a fraud action. See Unitype
Co. v. Ashcraft Bros., 155 N.C. 63, 67-68, 71 S.E. 61, 62 (1911); J.I. Case Threshing Mach.
Co. v. Feezor, 152 N.C. 516, 519-20, 67 S.E. 1004, 1006 (1910).
100. See cases cited supra notes 76-77.
101. See McCormick v. Jackson, 209 N.C. 359, 360, 183 S.E. 369, 370 (1936) (real estate
broker's representation that land could be sold for more); Outcault Advertising Co. v. Fain,
171 N.C. 714, 716, 89 S.E. 35, 36 (1916) (representation that means of advertising offered fdr
sale would cost no more than advertising in newspaper); National Cash Register Co. v. Town-
send Grocery Store, 137 N.C. 652, 655, 50 S.E. 306, 308 (1905) (representation of savings in
time and money from use of cash register offered for sale).
102. See Lamm v. Crumpler, 240 N.C. 35, 44, 81 S.E.2d 138, 145 (1954); Small v. Dorsett,
223 N.C. 754, 761, 28 S.E.2d 514, 518 (1944).
103. See Lester v. McLean, 242 N.C. 390, 396-97, 87 S.E.2d 886, 891 (1955); Oltman v.
Williams, 167 N.C. 312, 313, 83 S.E. 348, 349 (1914); Conly v. Coffin, 115 N.C. 563, 565, 20
S.E. 207, 207 (1894).
104. Shell v. Roseman, 155 N.C. 90, 94, 71 S.E. 86, 87 (1911).
105. See Galloway v. Goolsby, 176 N.C. 635, 639-40, 97 S.E. 617, 619 (1918); Frey v.
Middle Creek Lumber Co., 144 N.C. 759, 762, 57 S.E. 464, 465 (1907).
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would induce the recipient's reliance. 10 6
These observations apply equally in other areas in which the opinion
rule is invoked. Two North Carolina cases involving the sale of stock
vividly illustrate their application. In one, the seller represented that
"the stock is gilt edged" and "nothing better could be bought"; 107 in the
other, the seller represented that the corporation was "a gold mine" and
"a going concern." ' In the abstract these representations seem very
similar. Based on the circumstances present in each case, however, a
fraud claim was upheld in the second case but denied in the first.
2. Duty of Investigation and Inquiry
A few early cases seemed to place major responsibility upon the par-
ties to an arm's length transaction to determine all facts relevant to the
transaction for themselves. 9 When the facts, although misrepresented,
could have been ascertained by inquiry or investigation, reliance was not
reasonable as a matter of law. ' Thus, when the facts could have been
determined by survey,"1 examination of court records, 2 or inquiry of
third parties," 3 the court held reliance upon another's misrepresentation
of them unreasonable. In large part these cases seem to reflect an expan-
sive view by the court of what a seller could do and what a buyer should
expect in the promotion of the land or chattels offered for sale. On this
basis, the court treated the representations as if they were opinions. In
any event, such cases were few in number and were first limited" 4 and
then rejected' by later cases.
The duty of investigation and inquiry is stated in general terms by
the court in cases clearly decided on other grounds."I6 In cases in which
the fraud claim is rejected because the representation is held to be opin-
106. See Bell v. Harrison, 179 N.C. 190, 195, 102 S.E. 200, 204 (1920); Morrison v. Hart-
ley, 178 N.C. 618, 621, 101 S.E. 375, 376 (1919); Miller v. Mateer, 172 N.C. 401, 405-06, 90
S.E. 435, 438 (1916).
107. Early v. Eley, 243 N.C. 695, 698, 91 S.E.2d 919, 921 (1956).
108. Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 286 N.C. 130, 137, 209 S.E.2d 494, 499 (1974).
109. See Credle v. Swindell, 63 N.C. 305, 307 (1869); Lytle v. Bird, 48 N.C. (3 Jones) 222,
224-25 (1855); Fields v. Rouse, 48 N.C. (3 Jones) 72, 73-74 (1855). Credle and Lytle were later
expressly rejected by the supreme court. May v. Loomis, 140 N.C. 350, 358, 52 S.E. 728, 730-
31 (1905).
110. Credle, 63 N.C. at 306; Lytle, 48 N.C. (3 Jones) at 224-25.
111. Credle, 63 N.C. at 306; Lytle, 48 N.C. (3 Jones) at 224-25.
112. Fields, 48 N.C. (3 Jones) at 73-74.
113. Saunders v. Hatterman, 24 N.C. (2 Ired.) 32, 34-35 (1841).
114. Walsh v. Hall, 66 N.C. 233, 239 (1872).
115. May v. Loomis, 140 N.C. 350, 358, 52 S.E. 728, 730-31 (1905).
116. See Harding v. Southern Loan & Ins. Co., 218 N.C. 129, 135, 10 S.E.2d 599, 602
(1940); Berwer v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 214 N.C. 554, 558, 200 S.E. 1, 3 (1938).
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ion, commendation, or a promise looking to the future, the court often
has stated that the recipient of such a representation must investigate
before relying on it.I17 Reliance is unreasonable here because the repre-
sentation is opinion rather than fact; the court's admonition about the
duty to investigate adds nothing. In other cases, the matter represented
is fact but the fraud claim is denied because allegation or proof of falsity,
scienter, or some other essential factor is missing.118 These cases,
although fewer in number than the opinion cases, are more difficult to
dismiss. Even though other grounds for these decisions were present, the
court apparently believed that characterizing the recipient's failure to in-
vestigate as negligent provided additional support for the decision to
deny relief.
Cases in which the failure to investigate formed the basis for the
decision are rare.I19 On the other hand, cases finding reasonable reliance
despite the claimant's failure to investigate are numerous and cover a
wide range of transactions.1 20 They include cases involving misrepresen-
tations of title, 121 acreage,1 22 and boundaries1 23 of land-situations in
which the earlier cases had found reliance unreasonable. Reasonable re-
liance is not negated simply because the facts are available in public
records 124 or could readily be ascertained from a third person. 25 Thus, a
jury has been permitted to find reasonable reliance upon representations
that a third party no longer would be a selling agent in the territory the
117. Horton v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 255 N.C. 675, 680, 122 S.E.2d 716, 720 (1961);
Peyton v. Griffin, 195 N.C. 685, 688, 143 S.E. 525, 527 (1928); National Cash Register Co, v.
Townsend Grocery Store, 137 N.C. 652, 655-56, 50 S.E. 306, 308 (1905); Conly v. Coffin, 115
N.C. 563, 566-67, 20 S.E. 207, 207 (1894).
118. See Tarault v. Seip, 158 N.C. 363, 367-68, 74 S.E. 3, 6 (1912); Williamson v. Holt, 147
N.C. 515, 523-24, 61 S.E. 384, 387 (1908).
119. See Calloway v. Wyatt, 246 N.C. 129, 134-35, 97 SE.2d 881, 886 (1957) (representa-
tion that water supply was adequate); Williams v. Jennette, 77 N.C. App. 283, 285, 292, 335
S.E.2d 191, 193, 197 (1985) (representation that timber could be removed and land developed,
which was impossible due to great depth of peat found on land; vendor of undeveloped land
could not be liable for misrepresentation unless he induced the purchaser to forgo an investiga-
tion of the land).
120. See cases cited infra notes 121-32.
121. Currie v. Malloy, 185 N.C. 206, 215-17, 116 S.E. 564, 566-67 (1923). Contra Shiner
v. Traub, 244 N.C. 466, 468, 94 S.E.2d 363, 364-65 (1956) (regarding representations prior to
execution of deed merely as vendor's expression of confidence in his title).
122. Norburn v. Mackie, 262 N.C. 16, 24, 136 S.E.2d 279, 285 (1964); Haywood v. Mor-
ton, 209 N.C. 235, 237, 183 S.E. 280, 281 (1935).
123. Keith v. Wilder, 241 N.C. 672, 676, 86 S.E.2d 444, 447 (1955); Walsh v. Hall, 66 N.C.
233, 238 (1872).
124. Fox v. Southern Appliances, Inc., 264 N.C. 267, 270-71, 141 S.E.2d 522, 525-26
(1965).
125. See Olivetti Corp. v. Ames Business Sys., Inc., 319 N.C. 534, 543-44, 356 S.E.2d 578,
584 (1987); Cofield v. Griffin, 238 N.C. 377, 381-82, 78 S.E.2d 131, 134 (1953).
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claimant was assigned;126 that the army would pay the expenses of mov-
ing a mobile home incident to a change of station even though the claim-
ant was an experienced member of the military and the facts, were
available through the post transportation officer;127 that a tobacco allot-
ment would be transferred with a conveyance of the land when its truth
could have been determined from a local governmental office; 128 and
other representations. 2 9 Similarly, reliance has been found reasonable
when the representation related to the condition of machinery-a fact
capable of independent determination 3 0-- and even when the representa-
tion related to a court's disposition of the claimant's own lawsuit1 3' or
the number of feet of timber in the claimant's own tract of land.' 32 The
court itself has observed that "the rule is also well established that one to
whom a positive and definite representation has been made is entitled to
rely on such representation if the representation is of a character to in-
duce action by a person of ordinary prudence."'' 33 This statement, de-
spite some ambiguity in its expression, is clearly intended to declare that
reliance upon a positive and definite representation is reasonable unless
grounds to suspect its falsity exist.
The idea that the recipient of a fraudulent representation has a duty
to investigate and will be charged with knowledge of facts that reason-
able investigation would have disclosed is not, and probably never has
been, a part of North Carolina's law of misrepresentation. Its repetition
in the cases serves no useful purpose and invites confusion.
The court should discard the duty-to-investigate language and its
associated baggage. In cases involving opinion, obvious falsity, or other
facts insufficient to establish fraud, the duty to investigate contributes
nothing to the analysis or outcome. In cases in which reasonable reliance
is a genuine issue, the recipient's failure to investigate may be one cir-
cumstance, just as numerous other factors may be, used to determine
whether the recipient of the representation reasonably relied on it. Stat-
ing the relevance of a failure to investigate in terms of a recipient's
126. White Sewing Mach. Co. v. Bullock, 161 N.C. 1, 10, 76 S.E. 634, 637 (1912).
127. Strickland v. A & C Mobile Homes, 70 N.C. App. 768, 769, 321 S.E.2d 16, 18-19
(1984), disc rev. denied, 313 N.C. 336, 327 S.E.2d 899 (1985).
128. Whitaker v. Wood, 258 N.C. 524, 526, 128 S.E.2d 753, 754 (1963).
129. See, eg., Johnson v. Owens, 263 N.C. 754, 759, 140 S.E.2d 311, 314 (1965) (condition
of heating system); Gray v. Edmonds, 232 N.C. 681, 682-83, 62 S.E.2d 77, 79 (1950) (occu-
pancy of apartments and rentals collected).
130. J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. Feezor, 152 N.C. 516, 519-20, 67 S.E. 1004, 1006
(1910).
131. Stewart v. Hubbard, 56 N.C. (3 Jones Eq.) 186, 190-91 (1857).
132. Roberson v. Williams, 240 N.C. 696, 702, 83 S.E.2d 811, 815 (1954).
133. Gray, 232 N.C. at 683, 62 S.E.2d at 79.
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"duty" only distorts the reasonable reliance issue for the trial judge, the
jury, and the appellate courts.
3. Duty To Read
The idea that one is bound by a writing one signs or accepts,
whether or not one knows or understands its contents, is encountered
frequently in the North Carolina cases. In reality, this notion is a part of
the larger concept that the recipient of a representation must use reason-
able care to ascertain the truth of representations for his reliance to be
reasonable. Both the analysis used and the situations in which it is in-
voked parallel substantially those cases involved under the duty-to-inves-
tigate rule. The cases speak of the claimant's duty to read the writing
13 4
and characterize a failure to do so as negligence which precludes relief
from its terms.13 5  The court invokes the duty-to-read rationale in a
number of different contexts. Although the court itself does not always
distinguish these situations, doing so is essential to assess the significance
of the duty to read.
A duty-to-read analysis may be based upon either tort136 or con-
tract 137 principles; the cases, however, often focus on the claimant's fail-
ure to read rather than on the substantive theory.13 8 Further, in some of
134. Harrison v. Southern Ry., 229 N.C. 92, 95, 47 S.E.2d 698, 700 (1946); Watkins v.
Grier, 224 N.C. 339, 343, 30 S.E.2d 223, 225 (1944); Cromwell v. Logan, 196 N.C. 588, 593,
146 S.E. 233, 236 (1929).
135. Isley v. Brown, 253 N.C. 791, 794, 117 S.E.2d 821, 824 (1961) (negligence); Harris v.
Bingham, 246 N.C. 77, 79, 97 S.E.2d 453, 455 (1957) (utter heedlessness); J.B. Colt Co. v.
Kimball, 190 N.C. 169, 172, 129 S.E. 406, 408 (1925) (negligence); Clements v. Life Ins. Co.,
155 N.C. 57, 62, 70 S.E. 1076, 1078 (1911) (gross neglect).
136. The tort theory of course is fraud. The duty to read may be invoked when a party
seeking to enforce a writing as a contract misrepresents: (1) that the writing reflects a prior
agreement between the parties, (2) the character or essential terms of the writing, or (3) mate-
rial facts that induced the other's assent to the agreement evidenced by the writing. For a
discussion of each area, respectively, see infra text accompanying notes 152-54, 155-59, and
160-62.
137. Mutual assent is the primary contract principle to which the duty to read relates, One
party claims that an agreement evidenced by a writing was induced by fraud. If fraud is not
established, the agreement is enforced and the parol evidence rule or provisions in the writing
disclaiming an agent's authority to vary the agreement are relied on to exclude evidence of
prior nonfraudulent representations. The duty-to-read rationale is often used to explain this
result. For a fuller discussion, see cases cited infra notes 140-42 and accompanying text. In
other instances, however, the court relies on the parol evidence rule or a contractual disclaimer
without any apparent inquiry into whether the prior representations were fraudulent. The
duty-to-read rule is employed again to support this result. A possible explanation for these
cases is that the court implicitly holds that a failure to read precludes a finding of reasonable
reliance as a matter of law. For a fuller discussion, see cases cited infra notes 143-44 and
accompanying text.
138. See Setzer v. Old Republic Life Ins. Co., 257 N.C. 396, 401, 126 S.E.2d 135, 138-39
(1962); Watkins, 224 N.C. at 343, 30 S.E.2d at 225; Plotkin v. Realty Bond Co., 204 N.C. 508,
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these cases the fact that the claimant failed to read, while relevant, may
not have been essential to the application of the substantive principle.139
As a result, the cases initially suggest a much greater significance for the
duty-to-read rationale than appears from a careful study of them.
In one large group of cases, the claimant's allegation or proof of
fraud is insufficient. Because no other basis for relief exists, the claim-
ant's ignorance of the terms of the writing, disappointed expectations or,
at best, unilateral mistake becomes the only ground to support the
claim."4 Denying relief in these cases is consistent with the objective
theory of contract formation, 4 ' but the language in the cases usually
emphasizes the claimant's negligent failure to read rather than the pro-
tection of the other party's expectations.142 Another group of cases de-
cided under contract law involves allegations that the defendant's
misrepresentation induced the claimant's assent to the contract. These
cases deny relief on the basis of the parol evidence rule 43 or the presence
of a merger or disclaimer clause"4 in the contract. For reasons that are
not always apparent, the court did not consider the misrepresentation in
these cases. Contract principles also govern in still other fraud-in-the-
512, 168 S.E. 820, 822 (1933); Wilson v. Life Ins. Co., 155 N.C. 173, 176, 71 S.E. 79, 80
(1911). Harris demonstrates the appeal of this rationale. The owner of real property sued the
realtor for his losses incident to a lost sale as a result of the realtor's negligent failure to subject
the sale to an existing easement. Harris, 246 N.C. at 78, 97 S.E.2d at 454. Although insuffi-
cient proof of damages provided a completely adequate basis for denial of relief, the court
strongly asserted the failure-to-read rationale and concluded that the seller was "guilty of utter
heedlessness." Id. at 79, 97 S.E.2d at 455. Because the suit did not attack the transaction
implemented by the writing, the usual reason for applying the rationale did not arise under
these facts.
139. See Setzer, 257 N.C. at 399-401, 126 S.E.2d at 137-38; Isley, 253 N.C. at 793, 117
S.E.2d at 823; Harris, 246 N.C. at 79, 97 S.E.2d at 455; Plotkin, 204 N.C. at 511-12, 168 S.E.
at 821-22.
140. See Isley, 253 N.C. at 793, 117 S.E.2d at 823 (holding "[i]f there was mistake, it was
unilateral"); Barnes v. House, 253 N.C. 444, 450, 117 S.E.2d 265, 269 (1960) (finding no
fraud); Harrison v. Southern Ry., 229 N.C. 92, 94, 47 S.E.2d 698, 700 (1948) (finding claimant
fully understood contents of writing); Williams v. Williams, 220 N.C. 806, 811, 18 S.E.2d 364,
367 (1942) (finding no fraud; pleadings insufficient for relief for mistake or failure of considera-
tion); Griggs v. Griggs, 213 N.C. 624, 627, 197 S.E. 165, 167 (1938) (finding no fraud or
mistake).
141. Under the objective theory of contract formation, intent to contract will be found
when assent is reasonably indicated by a party's objective manifestations. JOHN D. CALAMARI
& JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 2-2, at 26-27 (2d ed. 1977).
142. See Barnes, 253 N.C. at 451, 117 S.E.2d at 270; Harris, 246 N.C. at 78-79, 97 S.E.2d
at 454.
143. E.g., Clements v. Life Ins. Co., 155 N.C. 57, 60, 70 S.E. 1076, 1077 (1911); Dr. Shoop
Medicine Co. v. J.A. Mizell & Co., 148 N.C. 384, 386, 62 S.E. 511, 512 (1908); Dellinger v.
Gillespie, 118 N.C. 737, 739, 24 S.E. 538, 539 (1896).
144. E.g., J.B. Colt Co. v. Kimball, 190 N.C. 169, 170, 129 S.E. 406, 407 (1925); Interna-
tional Harvester Co. v. Carter, 173 N.C. 229, 230-31, 91 S.E. 840, 841 (1917).
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inducement cases in which the claimant unsuccessfully seeks to reform a
contract. 14 ' The authority of all of these groups of cases is limited not
only by their reliance on contract principles but also by the fact that in
most of them the court could have reached the same result without using
the duty-to-read rationale.
The court, however, has applied the duty-to-read doctrine specifi-
cally to fraud cases. The cases, although not free of ambiguity, seem to
establish the following rule structure. Failure to read is related to the
determination whether reliance upon a misrepresentation is reason-
able. 46 If the maker of the representation in no way prevents the recipi-
ent from reading the document, reliance upon a representation is
unreasonable as a matter of law if the recipient could have discerned the
falsity of the representation by reading the document. 4 7 If the maker
misrepresents the character or essential terms of the writing, 148 misreads
the writing to the claimant, 149 or prevents the claimant from reading
it,' the claimant's failure to learn the truth by reading the document is
a circumstance that bears on whether she reasonably relied upon the rep-
resentation. A jury then determines whether the claimant acted pru-
dently by failing to read the document. 5
Applying the duty-to-read rule to misrepresentation cases is ques-
tionable. Use of the rule is objectionable both in principle and because it
does not provide an effective tool to resolve the issues arising in particu-
lar situations in which the court has employed it.
145. Industrial Loan & Inv. Bank v. Dardine, 207 N.C. 509, 510, 177 S.E. 635, 635 (1935);
J..B. Colt, 190 N.C. at 170, 129 S.E. at 407; Dr. Shoop Medicine, 148 N.C. at 386, 62 S.E. at
512; Floars v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 144 N.C. 232, 236-37, 56 S.E. 915, 917 (1907).
146. See Davis v. Davis, 256 N.C. 468, 472, 124 S.E.2d 130, 133 (1962); Pittman v. To-
bacco Growers Coop. Ass'n, 187 N.C. 340, 342, 121 S.E. 634, 635 (1924).
147. See Breece v. Standard Oil Co., 211 N.C. 211, 212, 189 S.E. 498, 499 (1937); Indus-
trial Loan, 207 N.C. at 510, 177 S.E. at 635; W.R. Grace & Co. v. Strickland, 188 N.C. 369,
373, 124 S.E. 856, 858 (1924); School Comm. v. Kesler, 67 N.C. 443, 448 (1872).
148. See, e.g., Mills v. Lynch, 259 N.C. 359, 362, 130 S.E.2d 541, 543-44 (1963); Butler v.
Armour Fertilizer Works, 193 N.C. 632, 640, 137 S.E. 813, 816 (1927); Dunbar v. Tobacco
Growers Coop. Ass'n, 190 N.C. 608, 610, 130 S.E. 505, 506 (1925); Modlin v. Roanoke R.R.
& Navigation Co., 145 N.C. 218, 225, 58 S.E. 1075, 1077-78 (1907).
149. See, e.g., Leonard v. Southern Power Co., 155 N.C. 10, 17, 70 S.E. 1061, 1064 (1911);
Hayes v. Atlanta & C. Air Line Ry., 143 N.C. 125, 128-29, 55 S.E. 437, 438 (1906); Dorsett v.
Clement-Ross Mfg. Co., 131 N.C. 254, 259, 42 S.E. 612, 613 (1902).
150. See, e.g., Taylor v. Edmunds, 176 N.C. 325, 327, 97 S.E. 42, 43 (1918) (deed "sand-
wiched in with other deeds"); Gwaltney v. Provident Say. Life Assurance Soe'y, 132 N.C. 925,
928, 44 S.E. 659, 661 (1903) (no opportunity to examine because writing was handed to claim-
ant in the street).
151. See, eg., Mills, 259 N.C. at 263, 130 S.E.2d at 544; Whitfield v. Carolina Hous. &
Mortgage Corp., 243 N.C. 658, 663, 92 S.E.2d 78, 81 (1956); Butler, 193 N.C. at 640, 137 SE.
at 816; .R. Grace & Co., 188 N.C. at 373-74, 124 S.E. at 858; Griffin v. Roanoke R.R. &
Lumber Co., 140 N.C. 514, 522, 53 S.E. 307, 309-10 (1906).
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The rule has been used when the parties enter into an agreement
before executing a writing that the defendant falsely represents as reflect-
ing their prior agreement.152 The claimant seeks to reform the writing to
show the true agreement. Although the duty-to-read rule is often in-
voked in these cases, it does not preclude relief because the character or
essential terms of the writing were misrepresented. Under these circum-
stances, the jury must determine whether the claimant reasonably relied
upon the false representation of the contents of the writing. Applying the
duty-to-read analysis to these facts unduly restricts the remedy of refor-
mation. For example, writings are often reformed for mutual mistake.
15 3
Reformation would not be possible if the duty-to-read rationale were ap-
plied, because deception about the character or essential terms of the
writing seldom would be present on these facts. If failure to read does
not preclude relief for mutual mistake, it clearly should not do so when
the defendant falsely represents that the writing incorporates the prior
agreement between the parties.' In addition, the concern that the refor-
mation claim itself may be fraudulently made is already answered in the
requirement that the claim be established by clear, cogent, and convinc-
ing evidence." 4 The fact that the terms of the writing are readily avail-
able and that they conflict with the alleged prior agreement, of course, is
relevant in assessing the claimant's credibility and the sufficiency of the
evidence to meet this stringent burden of proof. Therefore, no added
requirement of a duty to read is necessary to guard against unwarranted
claims.
A slightly different situation occurs when no agreement exists be-
tween the parties apart from a writing, assent to which is gained by false
representation of its character or essential terms. 55 Once again, failure
to read does not necessarily preclude relief in these cases; its availability
hinges on a jury determining that reliance on the representation was rea-
sonable. The claimant is usually successful in these cases. Thus, dam-
ages or rescission has been granted when the defendant fraudulently
152. See Manufacturers' Oil & Grease Co. v. Averett, 192 N.C. 465, 468-69, 135 S.E. 298,
299-300 (1926); Bell v. McJones, 151 N.C. 85, 87-88, 65 S.E. 646, 646-47 (1909); Modlin, 145
N.C. at 225, 58 S.E. at 1077-78; Cutler v. Roanoke R.R. & Lumber Co., 128 N.C. 477,483, 39
S.E. 30, 32 (1901).
153. E.g., Ollis v. Board of Educ., 210 N.C. 489, 491, 187 S.E. 772, 773-74 (1936).
154. See, e.g., M.P. Hubbard & Co. v. Home, 203 N.C. 205, 209, 165 S.E. 347, 349 (1932);
Manufacturers' Oil, 192 N.C. at 468, 135 S.E. at 299.
155. See Whitfield, 243 N.C. at 660, 92 S.E.2d at 79; Edney v. Motor Serv. & Sales, Inc.,
210 N.C. 569, 569-70, 187 S.E. 758, 759 (1936); Dunbar v. Tobacco Growers Coop. Ass'n, 190
N.C. 608, 610, 130 S.E. 505, 506 (1925); Leonard v. Southern Power Co., 155 N.C. 10, 17, 70
S.E. 1061, 1064 (1911).
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represented that a guaranty was only a letter of recommendation,"5 6 or
that a release was a paper to gain admittance to the hospital,- 7 to permit
payment of medical expenses, 58 or to pay the expenses of the injured
person's spouse.'5 9 Although the claimant usually succeeds on these
facts, it still seems unacceptable to make the availability of relief contin-
gent upon a finding that the claimant's failure to read was not negligent.
Permitting the defrauder to enforce an agreement when the other party
never intended to contract or instead meant to make an entirely different
agreement promotes no legitimate interest in the particular transaction
or in transactional stability generally. The parties assert two different
versions of the transaction between them. A jury in determining which
version to accept certainly should be free to consider that the writing was
signed by the claimant and that the terms of the writing could have been
readily ascertained. The duty-to-read rule, however, clutters the submis-
sion of this issue to the jury. If the jury finds that the defendant did not
prevent the claimant from reading the document, the duty-to-read rule
completely forecloses using this sensible approach.
The other major fact pattern in which the duty-to-read rule may be
asserted occurs when a contract between the parties is evidenced by a
writing and the provisions of the writing contradict facts the defendant
misrepresented in order to induce the claimant's assent to the con-
tract."6 The defendant, however, did not misrepresent the character or
contents of the writing. Most cases involving these facts have denied
relief as a matter of law because the claimant failed to read the writing.'
6'
Today, when an intentionally false representation is made for the pur-
156. Furst & Thomas v. Merritt, 190 N.C. 397, 399, 130 S.E. 40, 42 (1925).
157. Harrison v. Southern Ry., 229 N.C. 92, 93, 47 S.E.2d 698, 699 (1948).
158. Davis v. Davis, 256 N.C. 468, 471, 124 S.E.2d 130, 132 (1962); Dorsett v. Clement-
Ross Mfg. Co., 131 N.C. 254, 258, 42 S.E. 612, 613 (1902).
159. Cowart v. Honeycutt, 257 N.C. 136, 140-41, 125 S.E.2d 382, 385 (1962).
160. See, ag., Industrial Loan & Inv. Bank v. Dardine, 207 N.C. 509, 510-11, 177 S.E. 635,
635 (1935); J.B. Colt Co. v. Kimball, 190 N.C. 169, 171, 129 S.E. 406, 408 (1925); Interna-
tional Harvester Co. v. Carter, 173 N.C. 229, 230, 91 S.E. 840, 841 (1917).
161. E.g., Breece v. Standard Oil Co., 211 N.C. 211,212, 189 S.E. 498, 499 (1937); Dorrity
v. Greater Durham Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 204 N.C. 698, 700, 169 S.E. 640, 641 (1933). All of
the cases in this group seem to be based on the premise that evidence of the representation is
inadmissible under the parol evidence rule. See Dardine, 207 N.C. at 511, 177 S.E. at 635;
Dellinger v. Gillespie, 118 N.C. 737, 739, 24 S.E. 538, 539 (1896). Because the parol evidence
rule does not preclude proof of fraud in the inducement, however, its application depends on a
prior determination that the representation is insufficient to establish fraud. See Fox v. South.
ern Appliances, Inc., 264 N.C. 267, 270-71, 141 S.E.2d 522, 525-26 (1965); Lamm v. Crum-
pier, 240 N.C. 35, 44, 81 S.E.2d 138, 145 (1954). In these cases, that determination usually is
based on the recipient's failure to read the writing. See cases cited supra note 147. Although
the failure to read is the only reason given for denial of relief in some cases, the above analysis
seems implicit. See Crowell v. Logan, 196 N.C. 588, 593, 146 S.E. 233, 235-36 (1929).
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pose of deceiving the recipient, it is no longer sensible to charge the recip-
ient with knowledge of the contents of the writing and, on this basis, to
hold reliance unreasonable as a matter of law.162 Giving conclusive effect
to a failure to read also seems out of step with the developments cur-
tailing the recipient's duty of investigation.' 63 Furthermore, a convinc-
ing argument can be made that the defrauder who presents the writing
for signature or acceptance, as is usually the case, impliedly gives assur-
ances that the writing reflects the parties' prior negotiations, thereby
preventing the claimant from reading it.
Continued adherence to the duty-to-read rationale in its present
form is difficult to support in principle. First, the distinction between
assurances that are implicit in holding out the writing and assurances
received from verbal representation of its contents is too thin to deter-
mine the outcome of cases. Second, reasonable reliance does not provide
a good vehicle for resolving the parties', factual dispute about what agree-
ment, if any, existed. Third, When the defendant does not misrepresent
the character or content of the writing, this factual dispute is taken from
the jury and decided as a matter of law. Finally, courts are increasingly
unwilling to rely on the recipient's negligence in denying recovery for
intentional wrongdoing and, as a result, are unwilling to judge reliance in
terms of reasonable prudence.' 6
E. Damages
Like materiality, scienter, and actual, reasonable reliance, actual
damage is an essential element of a cause of action in fraud. 6 For ex-
ample, merely showing that credit was obtained by fraudulently overstat-
ing the value of assets will not establish actual damages if there is no
proof of a loss in the transaction.166 The courts have found actual dam-
ages when fraud induced a claimant to enter into a transaction with a
162. The written contract has become the standard method for transacting business and
must be signed before much of life's commercial activity can occur. Commercial contracts are
often long, complex, and highly technical. Reading them is often difficult; understanding them
may be nearly impossible. Because of the enormous time and effort required to read and un-
derstand the contents of such writings, many individuals routinely sign them without so doing.
As a practical matter, they have little choice.
163. See supra notes 109-33 and accompanying text.
164. Many fraud-in-the-inducement cases do not invoke the duty-to-read rationale at all.
The representation is not inconsistent with the writing; therefore, the opportunity to discover
its falsity from the writing is not present. See, eg., I.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. McKay,
161 N.C. 584, 591, 77 S.E. 848, 850-51 (1913).
165. Northwestern Bank v. Rash, 74 N.C. App. 101, 104, 327 S.E.2d 302, 304 (1985) (cit-
ing Johnson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C. 247, 253, 266 S.E.2d 610, 615 (1980)).
166. Lillian Knitting Mills Co. v. Earle, 237 N.C. 97, 105-06, 74 S.E.2d 351, 357 (1953).
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party with whom he did not wish to deal 16 7 or convinced him to surren-
der a note that was uncollectible because of the maker's insolvency. 168 In
contrast, the possibility that the claimant will incur future liability be-
cause of the fraud may not constitute actual damage. On this basis, re-
covery was denied when a defendant's liability insurer fraudulently
underpaid a medical bill that the insurer had agreed to pay, thereby ex-
hausting the benefits available that year, in the absence of proof that the
victim had to pay for medical expenses later incurred. 169 Similarly, proof
of liability that may arise because another's assumption of the claimant's
liability for debt is omitted fraudulently from a deed does not establish
actual damages.
1 70
No cause of action exists when the claimed loss would have oc-
curred even though the misrepresentation had not been made. For ex-
ample, losses arising from the collapse of an underground corrugated
metal pipe, represented as cement, could not be recovered when a cement
pipe also would have collapsed and caused the same damage.1 71 This
damages issue at times may be complex. In one case, despite the fact that
coverage providing double-indemnity benefits for accidental death in air
flight was unavailable from any insurer, the court upheld an action based
on an insurer's representation that its policy provided such coverage. 172
The claimant could show actual damage by proof that the same amount
of total coverage could have been obtained by increasing the amount of
the basic insurance coverage.
1 73
North Carolina, 174 consistent with a majority of jurisdictions, 7 al-
lows benefit-of-bargain damages in fraud cases. This measure allows a
successful claimant to recover the difference between the value he would
have received had the representations been true and the value of what he
actually received.' 7 6 A minority of jurisdictions limit recovery in fraud
167. Daniel Boone Complex, Inc. v. Furst, 43 N.C. App. 95, 104, 258 S.E.2d 379, 386
(1979), disc. rev. denied, 299 N.C. 120, 261 S.E.2d 923 (1980).
168. Ledbetter v. Morris, 48 N.C. (3 Jones) 543, 545 (1856).
169. Parker v. Hensel, 242 N.C. 211, 214, 87 S.E.2d 201, 203 (1955).
170. Speller v. Speller, 273 N.C. 340, 343, 159 S.E.2d 894, 896 (1968) (dictum).
171. Feibus & Co. v. Godley Constr. Co., 44 N.C. App. 133, 139, 260 S.E.2d 665, 669
(1979), rev'd on other grounds, 301 N.C. 294, 271 S.E.2d 385 (1980).
172. Pearce v. American Defender Life Ins. Co., 316 N.C. 461, 470-72, 343 S.E.2d 174,
180-81 (1986).
173. Id. at 471-72, 343 S.E.2d at 180-81.
174. Home v. Cloninger, 256 N.C. 102, 104, 123 S.E.2d 112, 113 (1961); Kennedy v. High
Point Say. & Trust Co., 213 N.C. 620, 622-23, 197 S.E. 130, 131 (1938); Morrison v. Hartley,
178 N.C. 618, 621, 101 S.E. 375, 376 (1919); Hoke v. Whisnant, 174 N.C. 658, 660, 94 S.E.
446, 447 (1917); Van Gilder v. Bullen, 159 N.C. 291, 296, 74 S.E. 1059, 1061 (1912).




to out-of-pocket damages 77-- the difference between the price paid and
the value of what the claimant received. In light of the large number of
cases applying the benefit-of-bargain rule178 and the supreme court's own
observation that the rule "is established by the uniform decisions of this
Court,"' 79 the court's recent comment that "[w]e do not have to choose
in this case between the majority and minority rules"'8 0 is, to say the
least, surprising.
Good reason exists for allowing benefit-of-bargain damages in fraud.
The usual tort rule permits recovery of the difference between the price
paid and the value received. Applying the tort rule in fraud places the
defrauder in a no-lose position. If the fraud succeeds, she reaps its bene-
fits. If it fails, she must surrender the benefits gained but is left in a
position no worse than she occupied before her unsuccessful attempt.
Nevertheless, the benefit-of-bargain rule should not be applied in-
flexibly. If the fraud victim has not or cannot prove benefit-of-bargain
damages, recovery under the out-of-pocket rule should be allowed if sup-
ported by adequate proof. As a number of jurisdictions have recognized,
recovery should be allowed under the measure of damages the claimant's
proof supports.18' The question whether to adopt this sensible approach
apparently has never arisen in North Carolina.
In this connection, however, one case requires brief consideration.
In Home v. Cloninger82 the plaintiff bought property that had to be re-
paired to make it correspond to the defendant's representations.18 3 The
supreme court held erroneous a jury instruction fixing damages in the
amount of repair costs at the time of discovery of the fraud.18 4 The ra-
tionale for the decision is unclear. The instruction may have been defec-
tive because it identified repair costs as the measure of recovery, because
it allowed recovery of costs prevailing at the time of discovery of the
fraud rather than at the time of its commission, or for both reasons. Evi-
dence of repair costs is probative of either benefit-of-bargain or out-of-
177. See id. at 767.
178. See, e.g., Norbur v. Mackie, 264 N.C. 479, 481, 141 S.E.2d 877, 880 (1965) (per
curiam); Garland v. Penegar, 235 N.C. 517, 519, 70 S.E.2d 486, 487-88 (1952); Hutchins v.
Davis, 230 N.C. 67, 73, 52 S.E.2d 210, 214 (1949); Helms v. Holton, 152 N.C. 587, 593, 67
S.E. 1061, 1063-64 (1910); Small v. Pool, 30 N.C. (8 Ired.) 47, 47 (1847). For additional cases
applying the benefit-of-bargain rule, see supra note 174.
179. Kennedy v. High Point Say. & Trust Co., 213 N.C. 620, 623, 197 S.E. 130, 131 (1938).
180. Britt v. Britt, 320 N.C. 573, 580-81, 359 S.E.2d 467, 471-72 (1987).
181. See, e.g., Hinkle v. Rockville Motor Co., 262 Md. 502, 511-13, 278 A.2d 42, 47-48
(1971); Selman v. Shirley, 161 Or. 613, 638-39, 91 P.2d 312, 322 (1939) (on rehearing).
182. 256 N.C. 102, 123 S.E.2d 112 (1961).
183. Id. at 102-03, 123 S.E.2d at 112-13.
184. Id. at 104, 123 S.E.2d at 113.
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pocket losses and, in the absence of contrary proof, probably should be
sufficient for the jury to determine either. This view is consistent with
decisions holding that evidence of repair costs is sufficient to establish
diminution in market value in cases involving injury to property.
18 5
Thus, logic and authority suggest that Home should not be interpreted to
hold repair costs insufficient proof of damages. Using repair costs as the
measure of recovery may still be erroneous, particularly when such costs
are inconsistent with other evidence of actual and represented values.
186
When conflicting evidence is not present, however, it is questionable
whether the jury instruction, even if erroneous, is prejudicial.
To the extent that Home suggests that only proof directly establish-
ing the difference between represented and actual value permits recovery
in fraud, the case demonstrates the pitfalls of strict adherence to an in-
flexible benefit-of-bargain formula. When the victim's proof establishes
actual loss caused by the defendant's fraud, denying recovery because the
evidence is insufficient to show benefit-of-bargain damages is simply
unacceptable.
In Wolf Co. v. Smith Mercantile Co.18 7 the court upheld recovery of
benefit-of-bargain damages and "such additional damages as would be
reasonably foreseen ... at the time the contract was entered into."' 88
The court apparently permitted the buyer of a defective machine to re-
cover for lost profits and the cost of installing the machine. Similarly,
when a buyer purchased land on which to erect a building and the seller's
fraudulent representation of the title delayed the buyer in obtaining con-
struction funds, the court allowed recovery of increased construction
costs resulting from the delay.' 8 9 Consequential losses arising from reli-
ance upon a misrepresentation may be the only damage suffered when
the fraudulent transaction does not involve the transfer of property. For
example, when a car dealership founders because of the distributor's
fraud, recovery of expenditures for advertising, space, and labor may be
appropriate. 90
185. Farrall v. Universal Garage Co., 179 N.C. 389, 392-93, 102 S.E. 617, 619 (1920)
(holding instruction stating measure of damages as repair costs rather than diminution in value
erroneous, but basing reversal on cumulative errors); Plow v. Bug Man Exterminators, Inc., 57
N.C. App. 159, 162-63, 290 S.E.2d 787, 789 (holding that cost of repair as a damage formula is
"equally acceptable" as diminution in market value), disc rev. denied, 306 N.C. 558, 294
S.E.2d 224 (1982).
186. Farrall, 179 N.C. at 393, 102 S.E. at 619.
187. 189 N.C. 322, 127 S.E. 208 (1925).
188. Id. at 326, 127 S.E. at 210.
189. Shreve v. Combs, 54 N.C. App. 18, 23-24, 282 S.E.2d 568, 572 (1981).




Recovering punitive damages poses a greater challenge for fraud vic-
tims. As the supreme court itself has observed, the law in North Caro-
lina related to the recovery of punitive damages in fraud cases has been
"singularly confused." '19 1 Swinton v. Savoy Realty Co.,' 92 decided in
1953, held that merely because a plaintiff proves fraud does not necessar-
ily entitle him to submit to the jury a claim for punitive damages.' 93 An
"element of aggravation" must be present before punitive damages are
awarded, 194 and this finding must be made on "the facts in each case."195
Subsequent court of appeals cases dealing with the issue are inconsistent.
One group of cases follows the Swinton analysis and usually denies recov-
ery.' 96 Another group adopts the view that fraud, without more, permits
the award of punitive damages. 197 In 1975 Swinton's ad hoc approach,
while not abandoned, was skewed somewhat when the supreme court
embraced the idea that "it is the general rule that ordinarily punitive
damages are not recoverable in an action for fraud."' 98
Observing that "fraud by its very nature involves intentional wrong-
doing," Newton v. Standard Fire Insurance Co.,' 99 decided in 1976, over-
ruled Swinton and discarded the notion that some additional element of
aggravation is necessary.2 'o This apparently is the court's final word on
the subject.20'
191. Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 112, 229 S.E.2d 297, 301 (1976).
192. 236 N.C. 723, 73 S.E.2d 785 (1953), overruled in part by Newton, 291 N.C. at 113, 229
S.E.2d at 302.
193. Id. at 725, 73 S.E.2d at 787.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 726, 73 S.E.2d at 787.
196. See, eg., Tuggle v. Haines, 26 N.C. App. 365, 369, 216 S.E.2d 460, 463, disc rev.
denied, 288 N.C. 253, 217 S.E.2d 681 (1975); Clouse v. Chairtown Motors, Inc., 17 N.C. App.
669, 671, 195 S.E.2d 327, 328-29 (1973); Poplin v. Ledbetter, 6 N.C. App. 170, 173-74, 169
S.E.2d 527, 529-30 (1969).
197. See, e.g., Stone v. Martin, 85 N.C. App. 410, 418, 355 S.E.2d 255, 260, disc rev.
denied, 320 N.C. 638, 360 S.E.2d 105 (1987); Payne v. North Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins.
Co., 67 N.C. App. 692, 696, 313 S.E.2d 912, 914 (1984); Shaver v. N.C. Monroe Constr. Co.,
63 N.C. App. 605, 616, 306 S.E.2d 519, 526 (1983), disc rev. denied, 310 N.C. 154, 311 S.E.2d
294 (1984).
198. Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 306, 218 S.E.2d 342, 344 (1975). This idea had been
introduced in dicta in two earlier cases. See Davis v. North Carolina State Highway Comm'n,
271 N.C. 405, 408-09, 156 S.E.2d 685, 688 (1967); Wilkins v. Commercial Fin. Co., 237 N.C.
396, 404, 75 S.E.2d 118, 124 (1953).
199. 291 N.C. 105, 229 S.E.2d 297 (1976).
200. Id. at 113, 229 S.E.2d at 302.
201. Terry v. Terry, 302 N.C. 77, 273 S.E.2d 674 (1981), followed the Newton holding. Id.
at 88, 273 S.E.2d at 680. Surprisingly, Terry relied on Hardy for the proposition that
"[o]rdinarily punitive damages are not recoverable," presumably purposely dropping the
words "in an action for fraud" from the statement as it appeared in Hardy. Id. (citing Hardy,
288 N.C. at 305, 218 S.E.2d at 344).
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II. NONDISCLOSURE
The generalization that in arm's length dealings one party owes the
other no duty to disclose material facts relating to the transaction has no
more validity than the claim that caveat emptor applies under such cir-
cumstances.20 2 Circumstances arise in which no duty of disclosure is im-
posed even though one party knows that the other is unaware of the facts
and that those facts would be important to her decision to enter into the
transaction. No reason exists to question the rejection of a duty of dis-
closure, for example, in cases like Sparks v. Union Trust Co.2"3 and Setzer
v. Old Republic Life Insurance Co.204 These cases, however, provide no
basis for a general denial of a duty of disclosure.
In Sparks, a bank knew that the borrower would use the loan pro-
ceeds to fund a transaction with another depositor who was insolvent.
2 1
The court held that the bank owed no duty to the borrower to disclose
the insolvency.20 6 The facts come within the rule that, in the absence of a
special relationship or unusual circumstances, tort law does not impose
on an individual a duty to take affirmative action to prevent loss to an-
other.2"7 In Setzer, an insurer that issued a series of credit life insurance
policies, each containing an indemnity provision covering loss of certain
body parts, later issued a new policy which omitted that provision.20 8
The court correctly held that the insurer owed no duty to inform the
insured of the omitted coverage because the indemnity provision was not
a significant factor in prompting the insured to buy either policy.
20 9
Liability often has been imposed when the nondisclosure related to a
material fact affecting the transaction between the parties.210 When a
duty of disclosure exists, nondisclosure constitutes fraud. Accordingly,
202. This generalization lacks vitality in five important situations: when nondisclosure of a
material fact affects a transaction between the parties; when a disclosure, although technically
true, is misleading in light of other facts that the representing party knows but does not dis-
close; when a party to a transaction actively conceals facts material to the transaction; when
the nondisclosing party has knowledge superior to the other and knows the other cannot rea-
sonably be expected to learn of the material facts; and when the nondisclosing party stands in a
confidential or fiduciary relationship to the other. See infra notes 210-31 and accompanying
text for a discussion of these principles.
203. 256 N.C. 478, 124 S.E.2d 365 (1962).
204. 257 N.C. 396, 126 S.E.2d 135 (1962).
205. Sparks, 256 N.C. at 479, 124 S.E.2d at 366.
206. Id at 482-83, 124 S.E.2d at 368.
207. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 25, § 56, at 374. An additional reason to find
no duty in this case is that the information relating to the other customer's account was confi-
dential. Sparks, 256 N.C. at 481, 124 S.E.2d at 367-68.
208. Setzer, 257 N.C. at 397, 126 S.E.2d at 136.
209. Id at 399-400, 126 S.E.2d at 137-38.
210. See cases cited infra notes 216-20.
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both the determination of liability and the measure of damages are con-
trolled by the rule structure governing intentional misrepresentation.
211
When a disclosure, although true in a technical sense, is misleading
in light of other known but undisclosed facts, liability is imposed.212 An
opinion, even when expressed in general terms, may constitute a fraudu-
lent misrepresentation when the defendant possesses undisclosed facts in-
consistent with the opinion stated.213
In some instances the line between active misrepresentation and
nondisclosure may not be distinct and a particular fact situation may be
placed in either category.2" 4 The way in which the circumstances are
characterized matters little, however, because liability is usually imposed
on one theory or the other.215 Liability arises when facts material to the
transaction are actively concealed.21 6
A duty of disclosure has been imposed in other cases in which active
misrepresentation was not present. In Brooks v. Ervin Construction
Co.217 the court held that the vendor owed a duty to the purchaser to.
disclose that the house was built on filled land; nondisclosure made the
vendor liable for damages incurred when the house settled.218 The duty
was defined as follows: "Where material facts are accessible to the ven-
dor only, and he knows them not to be within the reach of the diligent
attention, observation, and judgment of the purchaser, the vendor is
bound to disclose such facts, and make them known to the purchaser."
219
The duty of the seller to disclose to the buyer is now clearly estab-
lished.220 The duty, however, is limited in several ways. First, it exists
211. See Brooks v. Ervin Constr. Co., 253 N.C. 214,217-19, 116 S.E.2d 454, 457-59 (1960);
Brooks Equip. & Mfg. Co. v. Taylor, 230 N.C. 680, 686-87, 55 S.E.2d 311, 315 (1949).
212. See Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 286 N.C. 130, 137-38, 209 S.E.2d 494, 499-500 (1974);
Alston v. Maxwell, 16 N.C. (I Dev. Eq.) 18, 19-20 (1826). In Childress v. Nordman, 238 N.C.
708, 78 S.E.2d 757 (1953), the court imposed no duty upon a seller whose agent represented
that a building was free of termites when the seller later discovered the presence of termites.
Id. at 713, 78 S.E.2d at 761. The court stated that the representation related to conditions
existing when it was made and was not intended to extend to later conditions even if they arose
before the transaction was closed. Id. at 712-13, 78 S.E.2d at 760-61. The case is extremely
narrow in its approach and seems to reach an incorrect result.
213. Ragsdale, 286 N.C. at 138-40, 209 S.E.2d at 500-01.
214. See id. at 137-38, 209 S.E.2d at 500; Isler v. Brown, 196 N.C. 685, 686, 146 S.E. 803,
804 (1929); Alston, 16 N.C. (I Dev. Eq.) at 19-20.
215. Isler, 196 N.C. at 686, 146 S.E. at 804.
216. Home v. Cloninger, 256 N.C. 102, 103, 123 S.E.2d 112, 113 (1961).
217. 253 N.C. 214, 116 S.E.2d 454 (1960).
218. Id. at 219, 116 S.E.2d at 458.
219. Id. at 217, 116 S.E.2d at 457.
220. See Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 286 N.C. 130, 139-40,209 S.E.2d 494, 501 (1974); Harris &
Harris Constr. Co. v. Crain & Denbo, Inc., 256 N.C. 110, 120-21, 123 S.E.2d 590, 598 (1962);
Brooks, 253 N.C. at 217-19, 116 S.E.2d at 457-59; Brooks Equip. & Mfg. Co. v. Taylor, 230
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only for facts known by the seller.22' Furthermore, disclosure is required
only if the seller knows that the buyer is unaware of the facts and would
be unlikely to discover them in the exercise of due diligence.
222
Apparently, no corresponding duty of disclosure is imposed on the
buyer.223 The clearest case for denying a buyer's duty to disclose is when
the seller's knowledge is equal to or greater than the buyer's.224 This
situation usually exists when the information relates to the quantity or
quality of the seller's property. In Harrell v. Powell2 1 the government
leased and erected buildings on land owned by the seller.226 The party
who managed the property for the government learned of the govern-
ment's plans to give the buildings to the owner of the land.227 This fact
substantially increased the value of the land and prompted the manager
to buy the property.228 The court held that the buyer owed no duty of
disclosure and denied the seller any relief.2 2 9
When a confidential or fiduciary relationship exists between parties
to a transaction, a duty of full disclosure is owed by the fiduciary or any
other person in whom confidence is reposed. 230 Although a fiduciary's
liability may be predicated on fraud, including nondisclosure, the law
provides even greater protection for beneficiaries.2 3'
III. NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
North Carolina, together with an increasing number of other juris-
dictions, 232 now recognizes a cause of action for negligent misrepresenta-
N.C. 680, 686, 55 S.E.2d 311, 315 (1949); Isler, 196 N.C. at 686, 146 S.E. at 804; Brown v.
Gray, 51 N.C. (6 Jones) 103, 104-06 (1858); Case v. Edney, 26 N.C. (4 Ired.) 93, 95 (1843).
221. See Griffin v. Wheeler-Leonard & Co., 290 N.C. 185, 199, 225 S.E.2d 557, 566 (1976).
222. Brown, 51 N.C. (6 Jones) at 104.
223. See Harrell v. Powell, 249 N.C. 244, 249-50, 106 S.E.2d 160, 163-64 (1958); Smith v.
Beatty, 37 N.C. (2 Ired. Eq.) 456, 458 (1843).
224. Smith, 37 N.C. (2 Ired. Eq.) at 458 (holding that purchaser has no duty to disclose
presence of gold on land).
225. 249 N.C. 244, 106 S.E.2d 160 (1958).
226. Id. at 246, S.E.2d at 161.
227. Id. at 247, 106 S.E.2d at 162.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 249-50, 106 S.E.2d at 163-64.
230. Abbitt v. Gregory, 201 N.C. 577, 597-99, 160 S.E. 896, 906-07 (1931).
231. McNeil v. McNeil, 223 N.C. 178, 181, 25 S.E.2d 615, 616-17 (1943) (holding that
transaction is void when conducted without beneficiary's consent); Lockridge v. Smith, 206
N.C. 174, 178-79, 173 S.E. 36, 39 (1934) (holding that fraud is presumed when beneficiary
consents; fiduciary must show the transaction was fair and open); see also GEORGE T. BO-
GERT, TRUSTS § 96 (6th ed. 1987) (stating the rule that a transaction between a fiduciary and a
beneficiary fails unless the fiduciary proves the transaction was open and fair).
232. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 25, § 107, at 745-47.
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tion.233  Like fraud, negligent misrepresentation requires the
misrepresentation of a material fact, actual reliance, justified reliance,
and damages.234 The representation must be made for the purpose of
inducing the recipient's reliance.23 The requisite fault consists of negli-
gence in obtaining or communicating the information contained in the
representation; 236 a showing of knowing or reckless falsity is not
required.
The negligent misrepresentation cause of action evolved in the
North Carolina Court of Appeals in a series of cases over a ten-year pe-
riod.2 37 In the early cases the court of appeals simply viewed the claim as
one based on negligence and, in upholding a cause of action, rejected
arguments that recovery could not be had for economic loss standing
alone238 or by one not in privity of contract.2 39 Later cases adopted the
negligent misrepresentation description of the cause of action.2'"
A wide range of relationships and transactions have been involved in
cases upholding the cause of action for negligent misrepresentation: a
purchaser of realty relying on representations of the seller's real estate
broker 241 or engineer;242 a purchaser of corporate stock relying on repre-
sentations of a geologist hired by the corporation;243 an insured relying
on the insurer's representation that a substitute vehicle would be covered
233. Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 322 N.C. 200, 207-16, 367
S.E.2d 609, 613-18 (1988).
234. The North Carolina appellate courts have given little consideration to these issues, but
they occasionally address them. See Raritan River, 322 N.C. at 207-16, 367 S.E.2d at 613-18
(finding justified reliance); Alva v. Cloninger, 51 N.C. App. 602, 610-12, 277 S.E.2d 535, 540-
41 (1981) (finding actual and justified reliance); Stanford v. Owens, 46 N.C. App. 388, 394-95,
265 S.E.2d 617, 622 (finding actual and justified reliance), disc. rev., denied, 301 N.C. 95, 273
S.E.2d 300 (1980).
235. See Stanford, 46 N.C. App. at 395, 265 S.E.2d at 622.
236. See Raritan River, 322 N.C. at 209, 214, 367 S.E.2d at 614, 617 (adopting REsTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 522 (1977)).
237. See cases cited infra notes 238-48.
238. See Davidson & Jones, Inc. v. County of New Hanover, 41 N.C. App. 661, 667, 255
S.E.2d 580, 584, disc. rev. denied, 298 N.C. 295, 259 S.E.2d 911 (1979).
239. See Bradley Freight Lines v. Pope, Flynn & Co., 42 N.C. App. 285, 290-91, 256
S.E.2d 522, 525, disc. rev. denied, 298 N.C. 295, 259 S.E.2d 299 (1979).
240. See Stanford v. Owens, 46 N.C. App. 388, 394-95, 265 S.E.2d 617, 621-22, disc. rev.
denied, 301 N.C. 95, 273 S.E.2d 300 (1980).
241. Forbes v. Par Ten Group, Inc., 99 N.C. App. 587, 595, 394 S.E.2d 643, 647 (1990);
Powell v. Ward, 88 N.C. App. 61, 67-68, 362 S.E.2d 796, 799 (1987).
242. Stanford v. Owens, 76 N.C. App. 284, 286-87, 332 S.E.2d 730, 731-32 (appeal after
remand), disc. rev. denied, 314 N.C. 670, 336 S.E.2d 402 (1985).
243. Howell v. Fisher, 49 N.C. App. 488, 494-98, 272 S.E.2d 19, 24-26 (1980), disc. rev.
denied, 302 N.C. 218, 277 S.E.2d 69 (1981).
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by the policy without a special endorsement;2, " a general contractor rely-
ing on the representation of the owner's architect 245 or soil engineer; 246 a
home buyer relying on the representation of the lending bank's ap-
praiser;247 and the holder of a security interest in equipment relying on a
title search conducted by an attorney hired by the person giving the se-
curity interest.
248
Many of these cases have relied extensively on section 552 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.249 The Restatement recognizes a cause of
action for negligent misrepresentation only when the representation is
made in connection with a commercial transaction in which the supplier
of the information has a pecuniary interest.250 Both a commercial trans-
action and a pecuniary interest in the supplier were present in the North
Carolina cases recognizing the negligent misrepresentation cause of ac-
tion; none of the cases, however, expressly considered whether these facts
were essential to the cause of action.251 The Restatement extends liability
only to specific uses and users of the information that the supplier in-
tended to influence.252 These restrictions apparently are intended to
limit the supplier's liability to specific risks of which the supplier was
aware when supplying the information. Recently, in Raritan River Steel
Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland,253 the North Carolina Supreme Court
confronted this issue and adopted the Restatement position.254 In doing
so, it expressly rejected foreseeability, privity of contract, and a Califor-
nia balancing test2 55 as appropriate standards for determining the extent-
244. Bradley Freight Lines v. Pope, Flynn & Co., 42 N.C. App. 285, 290-91, 256 S.E.2d
522, 525-26, disc. rev. denied, 298 N.C. 295, 259 S.E.2d 299 (1979).
245. Shoffner Indus. v. W.B. Lloyd Constr. Co., 42 N.C. App. 259, 264-67, 257 S.E.2d 50,
54-56, disc, rev. denied, 298 N.C. 296, 259 S.E.2d 301 (1979).
246. Davidson & Jones, Inc. v. County of New Hanover, 41 N.C. App. 661, 668-69, 255
S.E.2d 580, 585, disc. rev. denied, 298 N.C. 295, 259 S.E.2d 911 (1979).
247. Alva v. Cloninger, 51 N.C. App. 602, 610-12, 277 S.E.2d 535, 540-41 (1981).
248. United Leasing Corp. v. Miller, 45 N.C. App. 400, 406-08, 263 S.E.2d 313, 317-19,
disc. rev. denied, 300 N.C. 374, 267 S.E.2d 685 (1980). Other situations also exist. See, e.g.,
Ness v. Jones, 89 N.C. App. 504, 507, 366 S.E.2d 570, 572 (1988) (upholding a claim for relief
based on real estate broker's misrepresentation that seller's wife would qualify for additional
VA financing).
249. RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (1977).
250. Id. § 552(2)(a).
251. Some cases, however, note the presence of these factors. See, ag., Forbes v. Par Ten
Group, Inc., 99 N.C. App. 587, 595, 394 S.E.2d 643, 648 (1990), disc. rev. denied, 328 N.C. 89,
402 S.E.2d 824 (1991).
252. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552.
253. 322 N.C. 200, 367 S.E.2d 609 (1988).
254. Id. at 207-16, 367 S.E.2d at 613-18.
255. In Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) (en bane), the California
Supreme Court announced a variable-factor balancing test to determine whether a third person
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of-liability issue.2"' Chief Justice Exum's opinion reflects the same con-
cerns as those expressed in the Restatement:
We believe that in fairness accountants should not be liable in
circumstances where they are unaware of the use to which their
opinions will be put. Instead, their liability should be commen-
surate with those persons or classes of persons whom they
know will rely on their work. With such knowledge the auditor
can, through purchase of liability insurance, setting fees, and
adopting other protective measures appropriate tothe risk, pre-
pare accordingly.2 7
Determining the significance of Raritan River is not easy. In hold-
ing that the complaint stated a cause of action, the court noted that the
complaint alleged
that when defendants [an accounting firm and its individual
partners] prepared the audited financial statements for [the cli-
ent] they knew: (1) the statements would be used by [the client]
to represent its financial condition to creditors who would ex-
tend credit on the basis of them; and (2) plaintiff [Sidbec-
Dosco] and other creditors would rely upon these
statements.58
These allegations, even when considered in the light most favorable to
the pleader, are ambiguous. One reasonable interpretation is that they
allege nothing more than knowledge that in the usual course of business
a variety of persons could rely on the financial statements in connection
with a variety of transactions. Another interpretation is that the ac-
counting firm knew that the statements would be provided specifically to
plaintiff, Sidbec-Dosco, and other creditors incident to obtaining credit.
not in privity with the plaintiff should be liable for negligent misrepresentation. Among the
factors a court should consider are
the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foresee-
ability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the
closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered,
the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and the policy of preventing
future harm.
Id. at 650, 320 P.2d at 19.
256. Raritan River, 322 N.C. at 211-14, 367 S.E.2d at 615-17. The court rejected the priv-
ity approach "because it provides inadequately for the central role independent accountants
play in the financial world." Id. at 211, 367 S.E.2d at 615. The court rejected the "reasonably
foreseeable" test "because it would result in liability more expansive than an accountant
should be expected to bear." Id. As for the California balancing test, the Raritan River court
found that its factors, such as the defendant's moral blame and the policy of preventing future
harm, would be "difficult to apply" and that the test unacceptably "approximate[d] a 'reason-
able foreseeability' test." Id. at 214, 367 S.E.2d at 617.
257. Id. at 213, 367 S.E.2d at 616.
258. Id. at 216, 367 $.E.2d at 618.
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The Restatement rule denies liability under the first interpretation and
imposes liability under the second.25 9
Nothing in Raritan River suggests which interpretation the court
gave to the allegations in finding them sufficient. The sensible conclusion
is that the court's decision, following the rule that pleadings are to be
construed liberally, is based on the second interpretation. The court's
endorsement of the Restatement and its assumption that its decision was
consistent with the Restatement provide further support for this position.
Nevertheless, some uncertainty surrounds Raritan River because of
the unusual way in which the court dealt with Illustration 10, set out in
section 552 of the Restatement.260 In Illustration 10, a creditor suffers
loss in relying on an accountant's negligently prepared financial state-
ments; liability is denied because the accountant had no knowledge other
than that such statements are used customarily in a wide variety of finan-
cial transactions and are relied on by a variety of users in connection
with these transactions. Although Illustration 10 parallels the fact situa-
tion under the first interpretation of the complaint suggested above, no-
where in its opinion does the court recognize this. Instead, the court
directed its inquiry to whether Illustration 10 requires the accountant's
knowledge of intended uses and users to come from the client rather than
another person.261 In making this inquiry, the court did not recognize
that, under the facts in Illustration 10, the Restatement rule denies liabil-
ity whether the information comes from the client, a third person, or
general knowledge of commercial practices.262 Finally, in rejecting any
requirement that the client be the source of the accounting firm's knowl-
edge, the court never inquired whether this view was a product of a mis-
reading of Illustration 10, but instead based its decision on the text of the
Restatement.2 63 Perhaps the most that can be said is that these circum-
stances create some doubt about the scope of the court's decision.
259. Comment (h) to the Restatement provides:
It is enough that the maker of the representation intends it to reach and influ-
ence either a particular person or persons, known to him, or a group or class of
persons, distinct from the much larger class who might reasonably be expected
sooner or later to have access to the information and foreseeably to take some action
in reliance upon it.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRis § 552 cmt. h (1977). Illustration 10 to this section appar-
ently was intended to illustrate a fact situation involving "a larger class who might reasonably
be expected" to rely. Id. § 552 cmt. h, illus. 10.
260. See id. § 552 cmt. h, illus. 10.
261. Raritan River, 322 N.C. at 215, 367 S.E.2d at 617-18.
262. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. h, illus. 10.
263. Raritan River, 322 N.C. at 215, 367 S.E.2d at 618.
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In a second case decided in the same appeal,2 the court held inade-
quate to state a cause of action allegations that the creditor (Raritan)
relied upon a Dun & Bradstreet report which specifically referred to the
accounting firm's audit report as the source of its information.26 Here
the pleadings, unlike those in the first case, were not susceptible of being
read to include an allegation that the accounting firm knew that Raritan
would rely on the reports. The greatest knowledge attributable to the
accounting firm, under the view of the pleadings most favorable to the
plaintiff, would be that in the ordinary course of business people custom-
arily rely on financial statements prepared by accountants. If this view of
the facts were taken, the facts would parallel those in Illustration 10.
The court, however, did not employ this analysis. Instead, it reasoned
"that a party cannot show justifiable reliance on information contained in
audited financial statements without showing that he relied upon the ac-
tual financial statements themselves to obtain this information." '266
This holding in Raritan River is based upon the idea that informa-
tion taken out of the context of the full financial statements and audit
report may be incomplete and misleading.267 This proposition is appeal-
ing in the abstract. When the information in fact is incomplete and mis-
leading, the conclusion is almost inescapable; reliance upon it is
unreasonable. Nothing in Raritan River, however, suggests that the in-
formation in the Dun & Bradstreet report was incomplete and mislead-
ing. It may well have given an accurate picture of the company's
financial condition.
The judgment denying Raritan's claim was clearly correct. The re-
quirement of reliance on the financial statements themselves is not an
unreasonable way to achieve the goal of limiting liability for negligent
misrepresentation. However, if the purpose of the rule which the court
adopted is to prevent indefinite and burdensome liability and to define
liability in terms of the risk undertaken, the rule is not particularly effec-
tive. If, on the one hand, an accountant knows that the financial state-
ments are intended for the use of a particular person and that person
264. Two creditors brought actions against the defendant accounting firm and its individ-
ual partners, and the court consolidated the two actions. Id. at 203, 367 S.E.2d at 611.
265. Id. at 205, 367 S.E.2d at 612.
266. Id. at 206, 367 S.E.2d at 612.
267. The court stated:
Isolated statements in the report, particularly the net worth figure, do not meaning-
fully stand alone; rather, they are interdependent and can be fully understood and
justifiably relied on only when considered in the context of the entire report, includ-
ing any qualifications of the auditor's opinion and any explanatory footnotes in-
cluded in the statements.
Id. at 207, 367 S.E.2d at 613.
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then relies on accurate and complete information obtained from a Dun &
Bradstreet report based upon the statements rather than from the state-
ments themselves, that fact does not enlarge the risk so as to make it
incommensurate with the accountant's undertaking. On the other hand,
if the accountant does not know that the statements are intended for the
use of any particular person, imposing liability because someone relies on
the statements themselves would result in a disproportionate burden. It
is again puzzling that the court did not mention that the accountant had
no reason to know that this particular claimant would rely.
The question of the appropriate measure of recovery for negligent
misrepresentation has not been presented to the North Carolina appellate
courts. Some jurisdictions apply the usual tort measure of recovery,
while others allow benefit-of-bargain damages.26 Under the former the
recipient recovers the difference in value between what he surrendered
and what he received in the transaction and thereby is restored to the
position he held before acting on the representation. 269 No recovery is
allowed for the additional benefits that would have been present in the
bargain had the representations been true.270 The policy considerations
supporting a benefit-of-bargain recovery apply with less force when the
basis of liability is negligence rather than intentional wrongdoing. 271
Consequential damages resulting from reliance on negligent misrep-
resentation can be recovered. For example, when a soil tester negligently
failed to discover that a building was built on filled soil, the purchaser
recovered from him damages caused by the fill, including the costs of
repairing the building and the building's decrease in value.272 In some
instances, consequential damages may constitute the claimant's only loss.
North Carolina courts have allowed building contractors to recover for
increased construction costs273 or liability to a third party274 incurred as
268. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 25, § 110, at 767-68. The benefit-of-bargain rule
usually is not applied when a person other than a party to the transaction makes the represen-
tation. Id. The third party in these cases will not benefit even if the transaction is induced by
the misrepresentation. Further, in many of these cases the formulary approach of the out-of-
pocket rule simply is not applicable and recovery is based upon the rules applying in tort to
determine consequential damages. See infra notes 272-74 and accompanying text.
269. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 25, § 110, at 767.
270. See id.
271. The out-of-pocket rule fully compensates the claimant for losses caused by the misrep-
resentation. The argument for considering the defendant's potential gain from the misrepre-
sentation as grounds for adopting the more favorable measure of recovery is less compelling
when the representation is negligent rather than intentional.
272. Stanford v. Owens, 46 N.C. App. 388, 394-95, 265 S.E.2d 617, 622, disc. rev. denied,
301 N.C. 95, 273 S.E.2d 300 (1980).
273. Shoffner Indus. v. W.B. Lloyd Constr. Co., 42 N.C. App. 259, 265-66, 257 S.E.2d 50,
55, disc. rev. denied, 298 N.C. 296, 259 S.E.2d 301 (1979).
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a result of reliance on the negligent misrepresentation.
When liability for misrepresentation is based on negligence, the con-
tributory negligence of the recipient in relying on the representation is a
complete defense.275
IV. UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES
Misrepresentation may give rise to a cause of action for unfair or
deceptive trade practices under Chapter 75 of the North Carolina Gen-
eral Statutes.2 76 The statutory cause of action may offer substantial ad-
vantages over the common-law action for misrepresentation. First,
section 75-16 authorizes recovery of treble damages. 7 7 Reasonable at-
torney fees also may be awarded in the discretion of the trial judge when
the statutory violation is willful and "there is an unwarranted refusal by
such party to fully resolve the matter which constitutes the basis of such
suit."2 7 Furthermore, establishing a statutory cause of action may be
easier in some instances because the common law's stringent require-
ments for misrepresentation need not always be present for conduct to
constitute an unfair trade practice.279 Defenses that operate to bar the
common-law action may not be recognized in the unfair or deceptive
trade practices claim.280 Finally, the compensatory damages recoverable
274. Davidson & Jones, Inc. v. County of New Hanover, 41 N.C. App. 661, 666, 255
S.E.2d 580, 583-84, disc rev. denied, 298 N.C. 295, 259 S.E.2d 911 (1979).
275. Stanford v. Owens, 76 N.C. App. 284, 287, 332 S.E.2d 730, 732 (appeal after remand),
disc, rev. denied, 314 N.C. 670, 336 S.E.2d 402 (1985).
276. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-1.1, 75-16 (1988).
277. Id. § 75-16. When an unfair or deceptive trade practice is shown, the trebling of dam-
ages is automatic rather than discretionary with the trial judge. Kim v. Professional Business
Brokers Ltd., 74 N.C. App. 48, 52-53, 328 S.E.2d 296, 299-300 (1985).'The total damages
fixed by the jury are trebled, and deductions for any amount the claimant owes the defendant
or receives from others liable for payment are made after the jury's award is trebled. See
Washburn v. Vandiver, 93 N.C. App. 657, 664, 379 S.E.2d 65, 69-70 (1989) (deducting
amount claimant owes to defendant); Olivetti Corp. v. Ames Business Sys., Inc., 81 N.C. App.
1, 24-25, 344 S.E.2d 82, 96 (1986) (same), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 319 N.C. 534, 356
S.E.2d 578 (1987); Seafare Corp. v. Trenor Corp., 88 N.C. App. 404, 416-17, 363 S.E.2d 643,
652-53 (deducting amount claimant received by others liable for payment), disc. rev. denied,
322 N.C. 113, 367 S.E.2d 917 (1988).
278. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16.1(1).
279. The cases suggest that requirements relating to fault, actual reliance, reasonable reli-
ance, and damages may be less stringent for an unfair or deceptive trade practice claim than
for a fraud claim. See infra notes 324-40 and accompanying text.
280. Contributory negligence is not a defense to an unfair or deceptive trade practice claim.
Winston Realty Co. v. G.H.G., Inc., 314 N.C. 90, 96, 331 S.E.2d 677, 681 (1985). Similarly,
the supreme court has occasionally stated that good faith and the absence of deception are not
defenses to an unfair or deceptive trade practice claim. See, eg., Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C.
539, 548, 276 S.E.2d 397, 403-04 (1981).
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in the two actions may differ.28 ' Thus, the unfair trade practices claim
may provide an alternative theory or the sole basis for recovery in mis-
representation cases.
The North Carolina appellate courts repeatedly have held that fraud
automatically constitutes an unfair or deceptive trade practice.282 Like-
wise, the court of appeals recently held that negligent misrepresentation
constitutes an unfair or deceptive trade practice.2 83 By the same reason-
ing, nondisclosure amounting to fraud is within the same statute.284
Promissory representations made with the intent not to perform them
may constitute unfair or deceptive trade practices.28 An unfair or de-
ceptive trade claim cannot be based on subsequent nonperformance,
however, when no such intent exists.286 In other words, proof sufficient
to establish a tort cause of action in either branch of misrepresentation
will also establish a cause of action for an unfair or deceptive trade
practice.
Although recovery for both fraud and unfair trade practices would
constitute double recovery and thus is impermissible,28 a claim may be
281. The cases suggest that the appellate courts will use a flexible approach in awarding
damages for unfair or deceptive trade practices and reflect willingness to compensate a wide
range of consequential losses. For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 341-52 and ac-
companying text.
282. E.g., Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 309, 218 S.E.2d 342, 346 (1975); Douglas v.
Doub, 95 N.C. App. 505, 514, 383 S.E.2d 423, 428 (1989); Leake v. Sunbelt Ltd., 93 N.C.
App. 199, 204, 377 S.E.2d 285, 288, disc. rev. denied, 324 N.C. 578, 381 S.E.2d 774 (1989);
Powell v. Wold, 88 N.C. App. 61, 68, 362 S.E.2d 796, 800 (1987); Kim v. Professional Busi-
ness Brokers Ltd., 74 N.C. App. 48,. 53, 328 S.E.2d 296, 300 (1985); Kent v. Humphries, 50
N.C. App. 580, 589, 275 S.E.2d 176, 183, disc rev. allowed, 302 N.C. 398, 279 S.E.2d 357,
modified, 303 N.C. 675, 281 S.E.2d 43 (1981).
283. Forbes v. Par Ten Group, Inc., 99 N.C. App. 587, 601, 394 S.E.2d 643, 651 (1990),
disc rev. denied, 328 N.C. 89, 402 S.E.2d 824 (1991).
284. See Starling v. Sproles, 66 N.C. App. 653, 656, 311 S.E.2d 688, 690 (1984). Failure to
disclose, as well as positive representations, may in some circumstances constitute an unfair or
deceptive trade practice when the facts would be insufficient to establish fraud. See Leake, 93
N.C. App. at 205, 377 S.E.2d at 289; Rosenthal v. Perkins, 42 N.C. App. 449,452,454-55, 257
S.E.2d 63, 66-67 (1979), limited by Bhatti v. Buckland, 328 N.C. 240, 246- 47, 400 S.E.2d 440,
444 (1991) (holding that Rosenthal's exemption from § 75-1.1 for homeowners selling a resi-
dence is limited to those who sell their own residence).
285. Kent, 50 N.C. App. at 588, 275 S.E.2d at 182.
286. Overstreet v. Brookland, Inc., 52 N.C. App. 444, 452, 279 S.E.2d 1, 6 (1981); Mar-
shall v. Miller, 47 N.C. App. 530, 542-43, 268 S.E.2d 97, 103 (1980), modified, 302 N.C. 539,
276 S.E.2d 397 (1981). An unfair or deceptive trade practice resulted when a condominium
developer made promises about planned recreational facilities without disclosing that a vote of
the homeowners' association and increased dues would be necessary before the facilities could
be built. Leake, 93 N.C. App. at 204-05, 377 S.E.2d at 288-89.
287. Process Components, Inc. v. Baltimore Aircoil Co., 89 N.C. App. 649, 655, 366
S.E.2d 907, 912, aff'dper curiam, 323 N.C. 620, 374 S.E.2d 116 (1988); Borders v. Newton, 68
N.C. App. 768, 770, 315 S.E.2d 731, 732 (1984); Marshall, 47 N.C. App. at 542, 268 S.E.2d at
103; cf. Bicycle Transit Auth., Inc. v. Bell, 314 N.C. 219, 230, 333 S.E.2d 299, 306 (1985)
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pursued on alternative theories and recovery had under the theory that
proves most advantageous.2 8 8 Because treble damages 289 and, in appro-
priate circumstances, an award of attorney's fees290 are recoverable in the
unfair trade claim, the statutory action will usually be preferred.
When double compensation for the same injury is not involved,
adoption of one theory may or may not preclude reliance on the other.
Because both punitive and treble damages are punitive in nature, recov-
ery of both in the same action has been denied on policy grounds.291 In
these circumstances the choice of theories depends on whether the award
of compensatory and punitive damages in the fraud action or treble dam-
ages in the unfair trade practice action is greater. A more difficult situa-
tion arises when total damages in the fraud action exceed treble damages
and attorney fees awarded in the unfair trade practice action. The court
of appeals, confronted with this situation, permitted recovery of compen-
satory and punitive damages on a fraud theory while upholding an award
of attorney's fees based on an unfair trade practice claim.292 The signifi-
cance of this case may be limited to its facts; there does not seem to be
any other situation in which the two theories could be combined to gain
some advantages of each.
The statutory claim for unfair or deceptive trade practices may in
some instances be the only provable claim. While proof of the common-
law tort action may establish the unfair trade practice claim, the require-
ments of the tort action need not always be present for conduct to consti-
tute an unfair trade practice. In contrast to fraud, for which well-defined
substantive requirements exist, the statutory cause of action is defined
simply as "unfair or deceptive acts or practices., 293 The task of distilling
("Where the same course of conduct gives rise to a traditionally recognized cause of action,....
and as well gives rise to a cause of action for [an unfair or deceptive trade practice], damages
may be recovered for [either cause of action], but not for both.").
288. Mapp v. Toyota World, Inc., 81 N.C. App. 421,426-27, 344 S.E.2d 197, 301 (permit-
ting election after jury verdict), disc. rev. denied, 318 N.C. 283, 347 S.E.2d 464 (1986). When
neither the pleadings nor the evidence gives notice of an unfair or deceptive trade practice
claim, however, an after-verdict request for treble damages comes too late. North Carolina
Nat'l Bank v. Carter, 71 N.C. App. 118, 122, 322 S.E.2d 180, 183 (1984).
289. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (1988).
290. Id. § 75-16.1.
291. Process Components, 89 N.C. App. at 656, 366 S.E.2d at 912; Mapp, 81 N.C. App. at
426, 344 S.E.2d at 301; Wilder v. Hodges, 80 N.C. App. 333, 334, 342 S.E.2d 57, 58 (1986);
Pinehurst, Inc. v. O'Leary Bros. Realty, 79 N.C. App. 51, 62, 338 S.E.2d 918, 925, disc. rev.
denied, 316 N.C. 378, 342 S.E.2d 896 (1986). Punitive damages are recoverable in the tort
action only; the statute does not authorize punitive damages in the unfair or deceptive trade
practice action. Pinehurst, 79 N.C. App. at 63, 338 S.E.2d at 925.
292. United Labs., Inc. v. Kuykendall, 102 N.C. App. 484, 492-93, 403 S.E.2d 104, 110
(1991).
293. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a).
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the statutory action's substantive elements from the cases is not an easy
one.
The cases leave no doubt that the appellate courts take an expansive
view of the statute's coverage. Following precedent under the Federal
Trade Commission Act,294 on which the North Carolina statute is pat-
terned,295 the cases define broadly the terms "unfair" and "deceptive."
A trade practice is unfair when it "offends established public policy" or is
"immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injuri-
ous." '296 A practice is "deceptive" when it has a capacity or tendency to
deceive.297 This expansive view also is reflected in the judicial statements
regarding the purpose of the statute29" and the courts' frequent observa-
tion that, in light of this purpose, good faith, intent, actual deception,
and reliance are irrelevant in determining whether conduct constitutes an
unfair or deceptive trade practice.299
The statutory cause of action applies only to unfair or deceptive acts
or practices "in or affecting commerce."' 0° "Commerce" is defined
broadly by the statute to include "all business activities, however denom-
inated."30 1 The statute expressly excludes from its coverage "profes-
sional services rendered by a member of a learned profession ' 30 2 and the
publication or dissemination of an advertisement without knowledge of
its deceptive character and without a direct financial interest in the prod-
uct or service advertised.30 3
The court, in determining when a transaction is in or affects com-
merce, has given full effect to the broad language of the statute. The
court has extended the statute's protection not only to consumers but
294. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1988).
295. See Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 542-44, 276 S.E.2d 397, 399-400 (1981); John-
son v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C. 247, 262, 266 S.E.2d 610, 620-21 (1980).
296. E.g., Johnson, 300 N.C. at 263, 266 S.E.2d at 621; Pinehurst, 79 N.C. App. at 59-60,
338 S.E.2d at 923; Winston Realty Co. v. G.H.G., Inc., 70 N.C. App. 374, 380, 320 S.E.2d
286, 290 (1984), aff'd, 314 N.C. 90, 331 S.E.2d 677 (1985).
297. Marshall, 302 N.C. at 548, 276 S.E.2d at 403; Johnson, 300 N.C. at 265, 266 S.E.2d at
622.
298. See, eg., Winston Realty, 314 N.C. at 95, 331 S.E.2d at 680; Barber v. Woodmen of
the World Life Ins. Soc'y, 95 N.C. App. 340, 346, 382 S.E.2d 830, 835 (1989), disc rev. denied,
326 N.C. 363, 389 S.E.2d 820 (1990); Concrete Serv. Corp. v. Investors Group, Inc., 79 N.C.
App. 678, 685-86, 340 S.E.2d 755, 760, disc. rev, denied, 317 N.C. 333, 346 S.E.2d 137 (1986).
299. See, eg., Marshall, 302 N.C. at 548, 276 S.E.2d at 403; F. Ray Moore Oil Co. v. State,
80 N.C. App. 139, 142, 341 S.E.2d 371, 373, disc. rev. denied, 317 N.C. 333, 346 S.E.2d 139
(1986); Concrete Serv., 79 N.C. App. at 685, 340 S.E.2d at 760; Wilder v. Squires, 68 N.C.
App. 310, 316, 315 S.E.2d 63, 66, disc rev. denied, 311 N.C. 769, 321 S.E.2d 158 (1984).
300. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a) (1988).
301. Id. § 75-1.1(b).
302. Id.
303. Id. § 75-1.1(c).
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also to competitors3° and noncompeting companies3°5 that have suffered
injuries to their business. The court has rejected attempts to limit the
scope of the statute to buyers and sellers, parties to some other contrac-
tual relationship, or parties to the transaction out of which the claim
arose.306 The statute has been applied to a wide range of transactions,
including: Selling consumer products or services;3°7 renting residential
housing;308 renting spaces in a mobile home park;30 9 selling realty; 310 in-
terfering with a loan transaction; 311 referral of prospective employees by
an employment agency;3 12 providing loan brokerage services;3 13 false ad-
vertising 314 by or disparagement 315 of a business competitor; leasing land
304. Pinehurst, Inc. v. O'Leary Bros. Realty, Inc., 79 N.C. App. 51, 52, 338 S.E.2d 918,
919, disc. rev. denied, 316 N.C. 378, 342 S.E.2d 896 (1986); Ellis v. Smith-Broadhurst, Inc., 48
N.C. App. 180, 180-81, 268 S.E.2d 271, 272 (1980); Harrington Mfg. Co. v. Powell Mfg. Co.,
38 N.C. App. 393, 396, 248 S.E.2d 739, 741-42 (1978), disc. rev. denied, 296 N.C. 411, 251
S.E.2d 469 (1979).
305. Olivetti Corp. v. Ames Business Sys., Inc., 81 N.C. App. 1, 21-23, 344 S.E.2d 82, 94-
95 (1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 319 N.C. 534, 356 S.E.2d 578 (1987); Concrete Serv.
Corp. v. Investors Group, Inc., 79 N.C. App. 678, 685, 340 S.E.2d 755, 760, disc, rev. denied,
317 N.C. 333, 346 S.E.2d 137 (1986); Chastain v. Wall, 78 N.C. App. 350, 351, 337 S.E.2d
150, 151 (1985), disc. rev. denied, 316 N.C. 375, 342 S.E.2d 891 (1986); Kent v. Humphries, 50
N.C. App. 580, 589, 275 S.E.2d 176, 182, modified, 303 N.C. 675, 281 S.E.2d 43 (1981).
306. United Labs., Inc. v. Kuykendall, 322 N.C. 643, 665, 370 S.E.2d 375, 389 (1988)
(holding statute's application to businesses not limited to buyer-seller relationship or fraudu-
lent advertising); J.M. Westall & Co. v. Windswept View of Asheville, Inc., 97 N.C. App. 71,
75, 387 S.E.2d 67, 69 (holding that claimant need not be in contractual relationship or a party
to transaction), disc, rev. denied, 327 N.C. 139, 394 S.E.2d 175 (1990).
307. Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 310-11, 218 S.E.2d 342, 347 (1975) (automobile); Da-
vidson v. Knauff Ins. Agency, Inc., 93 N.C. App. 20, 32, 376 S.E.2d 488, 495-96 (insurance),
disc. rev. denied, 324 N.C. 577, 381 S.E.2d 772 (1989); Northwestern Bank v. Roseman, 81
N.C. App. 228, 236-37, 344 S.E.2d 120, 126 (loan), aff'dper curiam, 319 N.C. 394, 354 S.E.2d
238 (1987); Eastern Roofing & Aluminum Co. v. Brock, 70 N.C. App. 431, 431-32, 320 S.E.2d
22, 22-23 (1984) (aluminum siding); Bernard v. Central Carolina Truck Sales, Inc., 68 N.C.
App. 228, 231, 314 S.E.2d 582, 584 (truck), disc rev. denied, 311 N.C. 751, 321 S.E.2d 126
(1984).
308. Love v. Pressley, 34 N.C. App. 503, 516, 239 S.E.2d 574, 582-83 (1977), disc. rev.
denied, 294 N.C. 441, 241 S.E.2d 843 (1978).
309. Marshall v. Miller, 47 N.C. App. 530, 541, 268 S.E.2d 97, 102 (1980), modified, 302
N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d 397 (1981).
310. Rucker v. Huffman, 99 N.C. App. 137, 141, 392 S.E.2d 419, 421 (1990) (builder-
vendor); Leake v. Sunbelt Ltd., 93 N.C. App. 199, 200, 377 S.E.2d 285, 286 (vendor), discr rev.
denied, 324 N.C. 578, 381 S.E.2d 774 (1989); Robertson v. Boyd, 88 N.C. App. 437, 443, 363
S.E.2d 672, 676 (1988) (real estate broker); Wilder v. Squires, 68 N.C. App. 310, 311, 315
S.E.2d 63, 64 (vendor), disc rev. denied, 311 N.C. 769, 321 S.E.2d 158 (1984); Love, 34 N.C.
App. at 516, 239 S.E.2d at 583.
311. Pedwell v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 51 N.C. App. 236, 237-38, 275 S.E.2d 565, 566-67
(1981).
312. Winston Realty Co. v. G.H.G., Inc., 314 N.C. 90, 98-99, 331 S.E.2d 677, 682 (1985).
313. Johnson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C. 247,261,266 S.E.2d 610, 620 (1980).
314. Harrington Mfg. Co. v. Powell Mfg. Co., 38 N.C. App. 393, 396, 248 S.E.2d 739, 742
(1978), disc. rev. denied, 296 N.C. 411, 251 S.E.2d 469 (1979).
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for a restaurant parking lot 316 renting commercial property in a shop-
ping center;317 selling a retail business; 318 selling a motel;319 a developer's
furnishing misleading information to the contractor's supplier;320 deal-
ings between a dealer and his distributors;32 1 interference with con-
tract;322 and breach of fiduciary duty.
323
A consequence of the court's expansive construction of the unfair or
deceptive trade practices statute is that the statute does not simply pro-
vide additional remedies for existing common-law actions but creates a
new cause of action free from many of the requirements for fraud or
negligent misrepresentation. Negligent, reckless, or intentional falsity is
not essential for a misrepresentation to constitute an unfair or deceptive
trade practice.324 Liability may be imposed even though the misrepre-
sentation is made innocently and without intent to deceive or mislead. 25
The court often has observed that the actor's intent or good faith is
315. Pinehurst, Inc. v. O'Leary Bros. Realty, 79 N.C. App. 51, 54, 59, 338 S.E.2d 918, 920,
923, disc. rev. denied, 316 N.C. 378, 342 S.E.2d 896 (1986); Ellis v. Smith-Broadhurst, Inc., 48
N.C. App. 180, 181-82, 268 S.E.2d 271, 272-73 (1980).
316. Wilder v. Hodges, 80 N.C. App. 333, 333, 342 S.E.2d 57, 57 (1986).
317. Kent v. Humphries, 50 N.C. App. 580, 581-82, 275 S.E.2d 176, 178, modified, 303
N.C. 675, 281 S.E.2d 43 (1981).
318. Chastain v. Wall, 78 N.C. App. 350, 351,337 S.E.2d 150, 151 (1985), disc. rev. denied,
316 N.C. 375, 342 S.E.2d 891 (1986).
319. Kim v. Professional Business Brokers Ltd., 74 N.C. App. 48, 53, 328 S.E.2d 296, 300
(1985).
320. J.M. Westall & Co. v. Windswept View of Asheville, Inc., 97 N.C. App. 71, 72-73,
387 S.E.2d 67, 68, disc, rev. denied, 327 N.C. 139, 394 S.E.2d 175 (1990).
321. Process Components, Inc. v. Baltimore Aircoil Co., 89 N.C. App. 649, 650-51, 366
S.E.2d 907, 909, aff'dper curiam, 323 N.C. 620, 374 S.E.2d 116 (1988); Olivetti Corp. v. Ames
Business Sys., Inc., 81 N.C. App. 1, 21-23, 344 S.E.2d 82, 94-95 (1986), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part, 319 N.C. 534, 356 S.E.2d 578 (1987).
322. United Labs., Inc. v. Kuykendall, 322 N.C. 643, 665, 370 S.E.2d 375, 389 (1988).
323. Adams v. Moore, 96 N.C. App. 359, 361, 385 S.E.2d 799, 801 (1989), disc. rev. denied,
326 N.C. 46, 389 S.E.2d 83 (1990); Seafare Corp. v. Trenor Corp., 88 N.C. App. 404, 406-07,
363 S.E.2d 643, 647, writ ofsupersedeas and temporary stay denied, 321 N.C. 745, 366 S.E.2d
871, disc, rev. denied, 322 N.C. 113, 367 S.E.2d 917 (1988); Starling v. Sproles, 66 N.C. App.
653, 656, 311 S.E.2d 688, 690 (1984); Whitman v. Forbes, 55 N.C. App. 706, 714-15, 286
S.E.2d 889, 894 (1982).
324. Pearce v. American Defender Life Ins. Co., 316 N.C. 461, 471, 343 S.E.2d 174, 180
(1986); Forbes v. Par Ten Group, Inc., 99 N.C. App. 587, 601, 394 S.E.2d 643, 651 (1990),
disc. rev. denied, 328 N.C. 89, 402 S.E.2d 824 (1991); Leake v. Sunbelt Ltd., 93 N.C. App. 199,
205, 377 S.E.2d 285, 289, disc. rev. denied, 324 N.C. 578, 381 S.E.2d 774 (1989); F. Ray Moore
Oil Co. v. State, 80 N.C. App. 139, 142, 341 S.E.2d 371, 373, disc. rev. denied, 317 N.C. 333,
346 S.E.2d 139 (1986); Chastain v. Wall, 78 N.C. App. 350, 356, 337 S.E.2d 150, 153-54
(1985), disc. rev. denied, 316 N.C. 375, 342 S.E.2d 891 (1986); Lee v. Payton, 67 N.C. App.
480, 482, 313 S.E.2d 247, 249 (1984).
325. Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 548, 276 S.E.2d 397, 403 (1981); F. Ray Moore Oil
Co., 80 N.C. App. at 142, 341 S.E.2d at 373.
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irrelevant.326
Requirements related to reliance are also less stringent. The extent
to which these requirements are relaxed, however, is unclear. In defining
an unfair or deceptive trade practice, the appellate courts repeatedly have
stated that reliance and actual deception are unnecessary; all that is
needed is conduct having the capacity to deceive or mislead the consum-
ing public.3 21 While these general propositions are consistent with the
overall purpose of the statute, a distinction ought to be made between a
private action for treble damages and the other means of enforcement
authorized by the statute-a lawsuit by the attorney general for injunc-
tion or civil penalty. Rejecting requirements for reliance and actual de-
ception, while sensible in suits by the attorney general to protect the
public interest, seems inconsistent with the "injured party" and "treble
damages" provisions of the statute's authorization of private action.328
Despite the fact that language in opinions involving private actions often
disclaims the need for reliance and deception, the actual holdings in the
cases are consistent with the distinction suggested. Reliance and decep-
tion have been present in cases upholding recovery329 and no case has
allowed recovery without them. Further, the absence of injury,330 dam-
age,331 or a causal relationship between the conduct alleged to be unfair
or deceptive and such injury or damage332 has been fatal to private ac-
326. Marshall, 302 N.C. at 548, 276 S.E.2d at 403; Wilder v. Squires, 68 N.C. App. 310,
315-16, 315 S.E.2d 63, 66, disc rev. denied, 311 N.C. 769, 321 S.E.2d 158 (1984).
327. See, E.g., Rucker v. Huffman, 99 N.C. App. 137, 142, 392 S.E.2d 419, 421-22 (1990);
Northwestern Bank v. Roseman, 81 N.C. App. 228, 237, 344 S.E.2d 120, 126 (1986), aff'dper
curiam, 319 N.C. 394, 354 S.E.2d 238 (1987); Pinehurst, Inc. v. O'Leary Bros. Realty, 79 N.C.
App. 51, 59, 338 S.E.2d 918, 923, disc. rev. denied, 316 N.C. 378, 342 S.E.2d 896 (1986);
Chastain, 78 N.C. App. at 356, 337 S.E.2d at 153-54.
328. The supreme court has rejected this distinction in a different context by overturning
the court of appeals' reasoning that a defendant's bad faith, while not required in proceedings
by the attorney general, must be present in a private damage action. Marshall, 302 N.C. at
548, 276 S.E.2d at 403, That decision, although sound in relation to the good faith issue, is not
authority for rejecting the distinction noted here. It is difficult to understand how injury and
causation can be present in a private damage action when there is no reliance on the represen-
tation on which the claim is based.
329. There are several cases in which such a disclaimer is stated or quoted but in which the
facts show that deception and reliance were present. See Pearce v. American Defender Life
Ins. Co., 316 N.C. 461, 468-73, 343 S.E.2d 174, 180-81 (1986); Rucker, 99 N.C. App. at 141-
42, 392 S.E.2d at 421-22; Northwestern Bank, 81 N.C. App. at 236-39, 344 S.E.2d at 126-27;
Chastain, 78 N.C. App. at 354-56, 337 S.E.2d at 152-54; Lee v. Payton, 67 N.C. App. 480,481-
83, 313 S.E.2d 247, 248-49 (1984).
330. See Miller v. Ensley, 88 N.C. App. 686, 691, 365 S.E.2d 11, 14 (1988); Ellis v. Smith-
Broadhurst, Inc., 48 N.C. App. 180, 184, 268 S.E.2d 271, 273-74 (1980). --
331. See Mayton v. Hiatt's Used Cars, Inc., 45 N.C. App. 206, 212, 262 S.E.2d 860, 864,
disc. rev. denied, 300 N.C. 198, 269 S.E.2d 624 (1980).
332. See Bailey v. LeBeau, 79 N.C. App. 345, 351-52, 339 S.E.2d 460, 464, modified per
curiam, 318 N.C. 411,348 S.E.2d 524 (1986); Ellis, 48 N.C. App. at 184, 268 S.E.2d at 273-74.
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tions in several cases.
Proof of reasonable reliance, however, is not likely to be required to
establish a cause of action for unfair or deceptive trade practices.33 In
Rosenthal v. Perkins,334 a case in which the plaintiff did not allege reason-
able reliance, a fraud claim was dismissed but an unfair and deceptive
trade practice claim based on the same facts was upheld.335 Further sup-
port for the position that reliance need not be reasonable is found in cases
rejecting contributory negligence as a defense to unfair or deceptive trade
practice claims336 and the rationale underlying such rtjection. Winston
Realty Co. v. G.H.G., Inc. 337 reflected that rationale: "If unfair trade
practitioners could escape liability upon showing that their victims were
careless, gullible, or otherwise inattentive to their own interests, the Act
would soon be a dead letter.
' 338
Several decisions suggest that even a true representation, if it has the
capacity to deceive, may give rise to an unfair or deceptive trade practice
claim.339 Such a representation may also form the basis for a fraud ac-
tion when the disclosure is incomplete, technical, or deliberately ambigu-
ous.340 The possibility exists that some representations in this category,
while insufficient for fraud, would support an unfair or deceptive trade
claim. The absence of any requirement that reliance be reasonable, as
333. See Winston Realty Co. v. G.H.G., Inc., 314 N.C. 90, 93-96, 331 S.E.2d 677, 679-81
(1985) (disavowing language in Libby Hill Seafood Restaurants, Inc. v. Owens, 62 N.C. App.
695, 699-700, 303 S.E.2d 565, 569, disc. rev. denied, 309 N.C. 321, 307 S.E.2d 164 (1983), that
"this sophisticated plaintiff could and should have verified defendants' assertions"); Robertson
v. Boyd, 88 N.C. App. 437, 441-43, 363 S.E.2d 672, 675-77 (1988) (denying fraud action on
grounds that purchaser had full opportunity to inquire, but upholding unfair or deceptive
trade practices claim); Strickland v. A & C Mobile Homes, 70 N.C. App. 768, 770, 321 S.E.2d
16, 18-19 (1984) (holding that experienced military personnel's failure to verify seller's claims
that government would pay costs of transporting mobile home did not bar finding of misrepre-
sentation), disc. rev. denied, 313 N.C. 336, 327 S.E.2d 899 (1985).
334. 42 N.C. App. 449, 257 S.E.2d 63 (1979), limited by Bhatti v. Buckland, 328 N.C. 240,
246-47, 400 S.E.2d 440, 444 (1991) (holding that Rosenthal's exemption from § 75-1.1 for
private homeowners selling a residence is limited to those who sell their own residence).
335. Id. at 452-55, 257 S.E.2d at 66-67.
336. See Winston Realty, 314 N.C. at 93-96, 331 S.E.2d at 680-81; Forbes v. Par Ten
Group, Inc., 99 N.C. App. 587, 598, 394 S.E.2d 643, 649 (1990); Concrete Serv. Corp. v.
Investors Group, Inc., 79 N.C. App. 678, 685, 340 S.E.2d 755, 760, disc. rev. denied, 317 N.C.
333, 346 S.E.2d 137 (1986).
337. 70 N.C. App. 374, 320 S.E.2d 286 (1984), aff'd, 314 N.C. 90, 331 S.E.2d 677 (1985).
338. Id. at 381, 320 S.E.2d at 290.
339. See Johnson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C. 247, 265, 266 S.E.2d 610, 622
(1980) (dictum); Davidson v. Knauff Ins. Agency, 93 N.C. App. 20, 32, 376 S.E.2d 488, 496
("technically true"), disc. rev. denied, 324 N.C. 577, 381 S.E.2d 772 (1989); Pinehurst, Inc. v.
O'Leary Bros. Realty, 79 N.C. App. 51, 59, 338 S.E.2d 918, 923 ("A statement can have a
capacity to deceive without being false.... ."), disc rev. denied, 316 N.C. 378, 342 S.E.2d 896
(1986).
340. See supra text accompanying notes 212-16.
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well as the more comprehensive nature of the statutory cause of action,
can be argued in support of this view. No case, however, has dealt with
the issue in a definitive way.
The appellate courts have given little attention to the measure of
damages for unfair or deceptive trade practices. The court of appeals has
indicated that when the conduct involved supports both a common-law
tort and an unfair or deceptive trade claim, determining damages for the
latter claim will not necessarily be controlled by the tort damage rules.34'
Nonetheless, in some cases use of the tort measure of damages in these
circumstances may be appropriate. When fraud exists, the tort benefit-
of-bargain rule, awarding the difference between the represented and ac-
tual value of the transaction, also has been used for the unfair or decep-
tive trade claim. 4 2 Presumably, a similar approach would be followed
when negligent misrepresentation is involved; however, whether the dif-
ference between the purchase price and the actual value received (the so-
called out-of-pocket rule) or benefit-of-bargain damages are recoverable
for negligent misrepresentation has not been decided in North Carolina.
In a case in which the facts were insufficient to establish fraud, the court
of appeals upheld damages for the difference between the purchase price
and the actual value received.343 Because the purchase price and the rep-
resented value were the same, however, the award was consistent with
either the benefit-of-bargain or the out-of-pocket rule.
In most of the North Carolina cases considering the damage issue,
the transaction had been rescinded and, for this reason, neither the bene-
fit-of-bargain nor the out-of-pocket rule was involved. Taylor v. Triangle
Porsche-Audi, Inc.,344 an early case relying on the theory that the claim-
ant must elect to rescind or to affirm and recover damages, held that a
buyer who recovered the purchase price incident to rescission "was not
damaged, nor injured within the meaning of G.S. 75-16.' '13" Treble dam-
ages have been upheld, however, in a number of later cases in which the
341. See Barber v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y, 95 N.C. App. 340, 346, 382
S.E.2d 830, 834-35 (1989), disc rev. denied, 326 N.C. 363, 389 S.E.2d 820 (1990); Bernard v.
Central Carolina Truck Sales, Inc., 68 N.C. App. 228, 232, 314 S.E.2d 582, 585, disc. rev.
denied, 311 N.C. 751, 321 S.E.2d 126 (1984).
342. Love v. Keith, 95 N.C. App. 549, 555-56, 383 S.E.2d 674, 678 (1989); Quate v. Cau-
dle, 95 N.C. App. 80, 86-88, 381 S.E.2d 842, 845-46, disc. rev. denied, 325 N.C. 709, 388
S.E.2d 462 (1989). In Bernard, the court, after noting earlier cases implicitly applying the
fraud measure, observed: "We do not believe, however, that the only available measure of
damages is that for fraudulent inducement." Bernard, 68 N.C. App. at 231-32, 314 S.E.2d at
585.
343. Lee v. Payton, 67 N.C. App. 480, 483, 313 S.E.2d 247, 249 (1984).
344. 27 N.C. App. 711, 220 S.E.2d 806 (1975), disc rev. denied, 289 N.C. 619, 223 S.E.2d
396 (1976).
345. Id. at 717, 220 S.E.2d at 811.
1992]
NORTH CAROLINA LAWREVIEW
claimant's recovery consisted solely or essentially of restitution of what
had been surrendered in the rescinded transaction.346 The conclusion
that Taylor is no longer authoritative seems inescapable.
The court of appeals, in granting rescission on grounds of an unfair
or deceptive trade practice, has recognized a wide range of losses that go
well beyond the recovery allowed when rescission is effected on other
grounds. For example, when the sale of a house was set aside, the buyer
was permitted to recover expenses and losses incurred in reliance on the
seller's representation, without regard to whether these losses conferred
benefit on the seller.347 Recovery included payments on the purchase
price, moving expenses, closing costs, and the costs of improvements to
the house. 348 One case permitted recovery of expectancy losses. 349 This
case allowed recovery of profits that could have been made through a
distributorship as well as expenses incurred in establishing it when repre-
sentations constituting a deceptive trade practice were relied on to termi-
nate the distributorship.35°
Flexibility in fixing damages for unfair or deceptive acts and prac-
tices seems desirable. Those acts encompass a wide range of conduct that
may or may not also constitute one of a variety of common-law torts.
That a single measure of recovery could span this whole range of conduct
seems doubtful. Further, the facts of individual cases are important in
identifying and measuring losses that should be compensated. The court
of appeals has found that the legislature intended to extend protection of
the public beyond what was available at common law and has recognized
that this purpose may be significant in determining damages351 as well as
in identifying substantive rights.352 The damages rule structure that has
346. See Douglas v. Doub, 95 N.C. App. 505, 510, 516, 383 S.E.2d 423, 425, 429 (1989);
Eastern Roofing & Aluminum Co. v. Brock, 70 N.C. App. 431, 435, 320 S.E.2d 22, 24-25
(1984); Bernard, 68 N.C. App. at 233, 314 S.E.2d at 585-86.
347. Douglas, 95 N.C. App. at 515-16, 383 S.E.2d at 428-29.
348. Id.
349. Process Components, Inc. v. Baltimore Aircoil Co., 89 N.C. App. 649, 651-52, 366
S.E.2d 907, 910, aff'dper curiam, 323 N.C. 620, 374 S.E.2d 116 (1988).
350. Id.
351. Barber v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y, 95 N.C. App. 340, 346, 382 S.E.2d
830, 834-35 (1989), disc. rev. denied, 326 N.C. 363, 389 S.E.2d 820 (1990); Process Compo-
nents, 89 N.C. App. at 651-52, 366 S.E.2d at 910; Bernard v. Central Carolina Truck Sales,
Inc., 68 N.C. App. 228, 232, 314 S.E.2d 582, 585, disc. rev. denied, 311 N.C. 751, 321 S.E.2d
126 (1984).
352. Winston Realty Co. v. G.H.G., Inc., 314 N.C. 90, 95, 331 S.E.2d 677, 680 (1985);
Barber, 95 N.C. App. at 346, 382 S.E.2d at 834-35; Concrete Serv. Corp. v. Investors Group,




evolved from the cases decided thus far, although substantially incom-
plete, reflects a flexible approach.
V. CONCLUSION
The causes of action for negligent misrepresentation and unfair or
deceptive trade practices significantly expand the right to recover for
misrepresentation in North Carolina. The reduced role of fault in deter-
mining liability for misrepresentation may be the most important change
effected by these new causes of action. Fraud, the traditional cause of
action for misrepresentation, arises only when the defendant makes a
representation with knowledge of its falsity. The cause of action for neg-
ligent misrepresentation expands liability for misrepresentation by al-
lowing recovery when a defendant acts unreasonably in determining the
truth of the representation or in communicating it. An unfair or decep-
tive trade practices claim may rest in knowing or negligent misrepresen-
tation; such a claim, however, also may arise when neither knowledge
nor negligence exists and perhaps even when the representation is true.
The statutory claim for unfair or deceptive trade practices further ex-
pands recovery for misrepresentation by providing for treble damages
and, in some instances, by denying the defense of contributory
negligence.
Developments related to the fraud cause of action are mixed. The
court's holding that a defendant's reckless disregard for the falsity of his
representation is insufficient to establish scienter is surprising and runs
counter to the trend diminishing the role of fault in misrepresentation.
This development increases the likelihood that a complaint alleging a
fraud cause of action will allege in the alternative a cause of action for
negligent misrepresentation. The court should reconsider its position on
the reckless disregard issue.
Except for scienter, reasonable reliance is the most important con-
cept in determining how extensive liability for fraud will be. Overall, the
North Carolina decisions support the view that reasonable reliance may
be found when the maker intends for her representation to be taken seri-
ously. Nonetheless, the language used by the court in many decisions is
troublesome. Even the term "reasonable reliance" is misleading if reli-
ance upon a representation intended by the maker to induce action meets
this test. The "duty to investigate" and "duty to read" language used by
the court also implies that the recipient is under an affirmative obligation
to ascertain the accuracy of the representation. All of this language
seems inconsistent with what the court ought to be and in fact is doing,
and should be discarded by the court.
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The most significant recent change related to negligent misrepresen-
tation has been the supreme court's express recognition of that cause of
action, which court of appeals cases had been developing for more than a
decade. Although the supreme court has decided only one such case,
many of the basic issues that arise in connection with negligent misrepre-
sentation have been resolved. In particular, the decision upholds recov-
ery by individuals who are not in privity of contract with the person
maldng the representation, as well as recovery when only economic loss
occurs. The other overriding issue related to negligent misrepresentation
involves deciding whether liability will extend to all persons and transac-
tions in fact influenced by the representation, or only to a more limited
group of persons and transactions. The North Carolina Supreme Court
has responded by adopting the Restatement's view, which permits recov-
ery only by persons for whose guidance the information was supplied and
only in connection with a transaction the supplier of the information in-
tended to influence.
The cause of action for unfair or deceptive trade practices may pro-
duce the most far-reaching change in the law of misrepresentation. In
some instances, it creates a right to recover when none would exist under
other misrepresentation theories; in other instances, it provides for a
larger recovery than would otherwise be available. The court has indi-
cated that a cause of action for unfair or deceptive trade practices may
arise from innocent misrepresentation or representation of true facts and
that neither reliance by nor injury to the recipient may be necessary for a
successful claim. Many of these statements, however, are dicta and thus
caution is clearly warranted in assessing their impact. Nevertheless, the
court, in interpreting the statute, perceives a legislative purpose to pro-
vide broad protection against unfair or deceptive trade practices. On this
basis, the court has readily extended the statute's coverage to an array of
activities. The clear indication is that the court's application will be in-
clusive rather than restrictive.
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